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ABSTRACT 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF INCENTIVES OFFERED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO  
PRIVATE DEVELOPERS OR LAND OWNERS ON THE RATE OF  
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT  
 
Erik Benjamin Simon 
 
 Redevelopment of brownfield sites has become increasingly popular since the 
inception of voluntary cleanup programs in the early to mid 1990’s. Local governments 
have begun to offer incentives to private developers or land owners to offset costs 
associated with contamination and encourage the redevelopment of properties that are 
typically underutilized. Incentives may take several forms including, but not limited to, 
fast-tracked project approval, risk based cleanup standards, liability relief, tax breaks, and 
direct funding assistance. 
 This study investigates how incentives that are offered by local governments to 
private developers or land owners influence the rate of redevelopment in their sphere of 
influence. A survey was administered to local governments throughout the State of 
California to determine how incentives are used for the redevelopment of brownfields. 
Results from this study show a preference by participating local governments to offer 
direct funding assistance, which may be directly linked to a relative level of inexperience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: brownfield, incentive, redevelopment, local government, private developer, 
land owner. 
  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 I would like to express my gratitude and respect for all of the help and support 
that I received throughout this process. My thesis committee, Mike Boswell, William 
Siembieda, and Elizabeth Lowham all provided valuable support and guidance in 
working towards a document that I am proud of. Special thanks to Elizabeth for all of 
your expertise and insight in brownfield redevelopment. I would also like to thank all of 
the faculty and staff in the City and Regional Planning department at Cal Poly for 
additional support. To my wife Anita Simon, you are a constant source of inspiration and 
an amazing pillar of support in my life. Thank you.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page
LIST OF TABLES ………………………………………………………………..... viii
LIST OF FIGURES ………………………………………………………………... ix
CHAPTERS 
I. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………… 1
 Research Question & Hypotheses ……………………………………. 2
 Presuppositions ……………………………………………………… 4
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ……………………………………………………. 7
 Brownfields Background …………………………………………….. 7
 Reasons for Brownfield Redevelopment …………………………….. 11
 Policies Surrounding Brownfield Redevelopment …………………... 14
 Voluntary Cleanup Programs ………………………………………… 17
 Incentive Packages …………………………………………………… 20
 Measurements of Successful Brownfield Redevelopment …………... 24
III. METHOD ……………………………………………………………………. 27
 Research Design ……………………………………………………... 27
 Materials Used in Research ………………………………………….. 30
 Preparation of Research Materials …………………………………… 30
 Participants …………………………………………………………… 34
 Identified Brownfield Sites …………………………………………... 38
 Protocol and Measurements ………………………………………….. 38
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION …………………………………………….. 41
 Rate of Redevelopment – Dependant Variable ………………………. 41
 Incentives – Independent Variables ………………………………….. 45
 Demographics – Contextual Variables ………………………………. 54
 Other Contextual Variables ………………………………………….. 57
 Other Observations …………………………………………………... 65
 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS - CONTINUED 
 
 Page
V. CONCLUSION ….…………………………………………………………… 67
 Incentives …………………………………………………………….. 70
 Future Research ……………………………………………………… 72
BIBLIOGRAPHY …………………………………………………………………. 74
APPENDICES 
 A.      Survey ………………………………………………………… 80
 B.      Invitation to Participants ……………………………………… 93
 C.      Map of California Participants ………………………………... 95
 D.      Database ………………………………………………………. 97
 E.      Statistical Tables ……………………………………………… 123
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table Page
1. Demographic Comparison of Sample Population to State of California …….. 37
2. Types of Incentives …………………………………………………………… 46
3. Chi Square Test for Redevelopment and Incentives ………………………….. 52
4. Correlation Between Different Incentive Types …………………………….... 122
5. Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Different Incentive Types .. 123
6. Correlation Between Demographic Variables and Incentives ………………... 124
7. Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Demographic Variables …. 125
8. Correlation Between Incentives and Other Contextual Variables ………….… 126
9. Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Other Contextual Variables 127
  
  
  
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Table Page
1. Number of known brownfield sites ………………………………………….. 42
2. Number of redeveloped brownfield sites ……………………………………. 43
3. Rate of redevelopment per respondent ……………………………………… 44
4. Frequency of incentives being offered ………………………………………. 47
5.1. Percentage of all incentive packages that include Fast-Tracked Project Review ………………………………………………………………………. 49
5.2. Percentage of all incentive packages that include Risk Based Cleanup …….. 50
5.3. Percentage of all incentive packages that include Liability Relief …………. 50
5.4. Percentage of all incentive packages that include Tax Breaks ……………… 51
5.5. Percentage of all incentive packages that include Direct Funding Assistance  51
6. Location of participating local governments ………………………………... 55
7. Local governments more or less likely to offer incentive with state or federal assistance …………………………………………………………………….. 62
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study investigates how incentives offered by local governments to private 
developers or land owners influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment within their 
sphere of influence. Federal and state level environmental policies have been created, in 
principle, to help protect natural resources and our earth’s environment from harmful acts 
by humans, which affects the redevelopment of brownfield properties. Given this 
constraint, local governments are increasingly responsible for creating their own policies 
that not only include cleanup of environmentally effected sites, but also include 
guidelines and programs with the intention of attracting private investment to the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites (DeSousa, 2006). Private redevelopment of brownfield 
sites continues to be an attractive development option in the face of uncertainty with 
levels of contamination and increasing measures of required remediation by federal, state, 
and local municipalities (Page & Rabinowitz, 1994). Redevelopment of brownfield sites 
is being increasingly promoted by local governments that are providing incentive 
packages to private developers or land owners in order to attract development investment 
within their sphere of influence (Alberini, Longo, Tonin, Trombetta, & Turvani, 2005, 
DeSousa, 2006).  
Brownfields are defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) as “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be 
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or 
contaminant” (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). The EPA estimates that 
there are approximately half a million industrial brownfield sites throughout the United 
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States that have the potential for redevelopment projects. The majority of these sites are 
privately owned resulting in the decision to redevelop lying solely on the landowner.  In 
many cases, this decision occurs at the time when the landowner would like to sell the 
property.  
Research Question and Hypotheses 
Private development companies have begun to initiate redevelopment of 
brownfield projects where past development would typically have required some form of 
mandate from federal, state, or local government (Meyer & Lyons, 2000). The increasing 
reliance on incentive packages offered by local governments to promote the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites has led to this investigation on their effectiveness. 
How do incentives that are offered by local governments to private developers or land 
owners influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment? Although the decision to invest 
in industrial brownfield redevelopment projects by private companies has historically 
been based on issues of liability, research has shown that incentives such as reduction of 
regulatory burden and subsidies can significantly influence the rate of redevelopment 
(Alberini et al., 2005). This study is centered on a hypothesis that different types of 
incentives positively affect the rate of redevelopment. Five independent types of 
incentives are researched in this study; 1) fast-tracked or streamline application review 
process, 2) risk based cleanup standards, 3) liability relief or indemnification from future 
site cleanup, 4) tax breaks, and 5) direct funding assistance.  
Findings are presented from an administered survey to local governments in the 
State of California that have authority to offer incentive packages as a means of 
promoting investment in brownfield redevelopment. The dependent variable of this study 
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is the rate of brownfield redevelopment within a participating local government’s sphere 
of influence. The independent variables of this study that influence the rate of 
redevelopment are the five different types of incentives. Additional contextual variables 
exist the may affect the independent variables as well as the dependent variable. The 
contextual variables are separated by demographics and other key elements affecting the 
brownfield redevelopment process. Connections between the contextual variables and 
independent variables are measured to determine how they may influence the incentive 
packages that are created for brownfield redevelopment. Connections between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables are measured to determine how 
incentives influence the rate of redevelopment.  
Stakeholders of an industrial brownfield project can include property owners, 
regulators, consultants, lenders, city/county planners, economic development 
agencies/authorities, politicians, developers, real estate agents, academics/students, 
lawyers, and surrounding communities (Lang & McNeil, 2004). This study focuses on 
two main groups of stakeholders; private developers or land owners and local 
governments. Results of this study are useful to these two main groups of stakeholders in 
showing how incentives offered by local governments influence the rate of 
redevelopment within their sphere of influence. Benefits to private developers or land 
owners may include knowledge that targets specific redevelopment projects resulting in 
higher returns on investment. Local governments may benefit from this study by gaining 
information regarding how other similar entities engage private developers or land 
owners to promote redevelopment of brownfield sites. Deductions from this proposed 
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study can be used in an applied manner to future considerations of investment into 
brownfield redevelopment projects by the different stakeholder groups.  
Presuppositions 
 A presupposition that private land owners are primarily responsible for the 
decision to invest in the redevelopment of brownfields. 
The decision to redevelop privately held brownfield lands, excluding sites with 
extenuating public safety and health risks, rests solely with the land owner. Even in cases 
where federal level policies mandate remediation of contaminated lands, redevelopment 
to a highest and best use is not always required. Private development companies or land 
owners choose to invest in brownfield redevelopment projects for several reasons 
including, but not limited to lower land costs, use of existing infrastructure, ecological 
and public health impacts or government mandated cleanup measures (Howland, 2003; 
Greenberg, Lowrie, Mayer, Miller & Solitare, 2001; DeSousa, 2006). Private developers 
or land owners may also be influenced by incentives for brownfield redevelopment that 
are offered by local governments. Alberini et al. (2005) examine market based incentives 
offered to private development companies with the intention of promoting environmental 
remediation and reuse of brownfields and how these incentives, along with regulatory 
relief, can influence land use. Research is silent on whether or not the offering of 
incentives to private development companies for brownfield redevelopment increases the 
amount of projects within that municipal government’s sphere of influence.  
 A presupposition that private developers or land owners who chose to invest in 
brownfield redevelopment require incentives to offset the costs associated with 
contamination. 
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Many locations of brownfields present an opportunity to rehabilitate 
neighborhoods suffering from economic hardship, blight, and general disrepair 
(Dennison, 1998, Meyer & Lyons, 2000, Greenberg et al., 2001). Despite the potential for 
revitalization, challenges with technical issues of remediation and general liability 
typically restrict local governments from undertaking significant brownfield 
redevelopment projects (Hird, 1993).  In addition, costs associated with remediation of 
contaminated lands generally make redevelopment a less desirable option for many 
private developers or land owners.  
The strict enforcement of liability stemming from CERCLA in the early 1980’s 
has cultivated a sense of fear in potential brownfield investors and has caused them to shy 
away from becoming involved with the redevelopment of contaminated sites (Reger, 
1998). Voluntary cleanup programs were established in the early 1990’s in an attempt to 
expedite remediation and redevelopment of contaminated sites (Greenberg et al., 2001). 
Several other programs initiated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
after CERCLA, including the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative, 
Brownfields Action Agenda, and the Brownfields National Partnership, were introduced 
mainly for the purpose of offsetting remediation costs and to provide incentives for 
brownfield redevelopment (Lowham, 2007). 
 A presupposition that incentives offered by local governments to private 
developers or land owners increase the rate of brownfield redevelopment. 
The redevelopment of brownfield sites is becoming increasingly popular with 
private development entities for several reasons including, but not limited to prime 
market conditions surrounding the reuse of existing sites and the increased involvement 
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by local governments who have historically been risk averse by staying away from 
complex redevelopments involving contamination (Goldstein, 2003). This increased 
involvement by local governments is typically recognized through incentives offered to 
private developers or land owners for redevelopment that meets the needs of all 
stakeholders. Incentives associated with the redevelopment of brownfield sites are 
designed to have positive effects through fostering development activities and have 
demonstrated their effectiveness (Alberini et al., 2005, Goldstein, 2003).  
 These three presuppositions create a framework in which this study investigates 
how incentives offered by local governments influence the rate of brownfield 
redevelopment. The literature review provides further background on the history, 
processes and outcomes of brownfield redevelopment. Incentives investigated in this 
study are presented and explained through research.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Brownfields Background 
Targeted revitalization of contaminated lands is a relatively young phenomenon. 
Looking at the history and evolution of brownfields and their redevelopment shows how 
private developers and land owners have undergone a paradigm shift of avoidance to that 
of pursuit. The catalyst of this paradigm shift is incentive packages that are offered by 
federal, state, and local governments to private developers and land owners for the 
redevelopment of contaminated lands. This process is one of trial and error.   
Post World War II industrialization was a transitional time for America. During 
the decades following the war, many companies sought to increase their operations and 
began migrating to new areas, ending the use of existing facilities and abandoning the 
original site in many cases (DeSousa, 2005, Lowham, 2007). Many of these abandoned 
sites have contaminants from previous uses, one of the characteristics causing them to be 
classified as brownfields. It is estimated that there are approximately 500,000 brownfield 
sites throughout the United States (Simons, 1999); however, some estimates have reached 
over one million such sites (Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007). The abandonment and 
hazardous condition of many sites can contribute to economic hardship, poor aesthetics, 
and apparent lack of concern for human health in areas already considered blighted. 
Given these conditions, most brownfield sites are not historically considered to be 
attractive investment options to private development companies (Howland, 2003). 
Little attention was typically given to the negative conditions of most 
contaminated sites until 1978, when the situation at Love Canal sparked national interest. 
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Love Canal is a 36 square block neighborhood located in upstate New York near Niagara 
Falls used as a dumping ground for toxic waste in the 1940’s and 1950’s by a chemical 
manufacturing company. The buried contaminants of the site eventually leached out and 
are believed to have caused significant health problems for residents of the area (Maugh, 
1982). This became an international media frenzy resulting in President Jimmy Carter’s 
declaration of Federal Emergency on August 7, 1978. The declaration resulted in the 
relocation of residents closest to the contamination (UB Love Canal Collections, 2008). 
Although there had been other national incidents involving human health and 
contaminated sites, the Love Canal incident raised national awareness of an issue that 
needed to be addressed. 
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERCLA) on December 11, 1980 largely in response to the Love 
Canal incident (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). This law, commonly 
referred to as Superfund, provides measures for chemical and petroleum producing 
companies to be taxed and grants federal authorities the power to protect human health 
and environment. The Superfund program got off to a very slow start for several reasons, 
mainly because it was a new and untested program. The lack of technical knowledge 
surrounding remediation techniques for contaminated lands was another key reason for 
the slow start (deSaillen, 1993). Over 1.5 billion dollars was collected within a five year 
period from Superfund’s inception, with the money being directed to a trust fund for 
cleaning up sites that have contaminants, but that proved to be insufficient (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). Funds were exhausted by 1985, which led to 
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, increasing funds 
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through property tax and providing for studies and research of new technologies aiding in 
the cleanup of brownfield sites (deSaillen, 1993). 
The mandates of CERCLA have been stern since its inception in 1980. CERCLA 
sets stringent liability standards where the government only needs to prove any past 
involvement with a contaminated site rather than direct responsibility for its 
contamination (Reger, 1998). CERCLA recognizes four categories of potential 
responsible parties that can be held liable for cleanup and remedial action of any potential 
damage that is done to natural resources. These categories include (1) the current owners 
or operators of the site, (2) any past owners that may have contributed to waste or 
hazardous disposal of materials, (3) generators of any hazardous substances related by 
contract to site operations, and (4) any transporters of hazardous substances to and from 
the site (Sundar & Grossman, 2003). CERCLA sometimes reaches beyond the confines 
of these four categories and in some extreme cases, lenders who have foreclosed on 
contaminated properties have been held liable for cleanup costs (Fogleman, 1992, 
Lowham, 2007). The rigorous enforcement of liability has cultivated fear in land owners 
and potential private investors, causing them to shy away from becoming involved with 
the redevelopment of contaminated sites. In addition, extensive legal battles in court over 
liability delays site remediation activities, as well as create negative connotations 
associated with Superfund sites (Lowham, 2007). The litigious nature of CERCLA and 
its slow initial results have raised concerns over its effectiveness and questions its 
fundamental focus being on the remediation of contaminated sites. 
Individual states began to develop voluntary cleanup programs (VCP) in the early 
to mid 1990’s in response to the perceived ineffectiveness of CERCLA. VCP’s were 
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initially pursued because of a lack of funding for the remediation of a large number of 
contaminated sites (Alberini, 2007). VCP’s also offer an opportunity to expedite 
remediation and redevelopment of underutilized land (Greenberg et al., 2001). Each state 
is autonomous in developing their VCP but the initial framework for programs allow the 
state to maintain control over plan approval and site development while setting up a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the EPA. After all parties agree to the MoA for 
the state’s VCP, the state has complete control over remediation plans for the 
contaminated site and redevelopment projects move forward in an expedited manner.   
These programs led to third party entities, not associated with the cause of the 
contamination, to remediate the site according to the MoA and alleviate the liability of 
the property owner through property transfer and required reporting techniques 
(Maldonado, 1996). This arrangement allows for a win-win situation where a third party 
entity profits from completing remediation activities, the land owner reduces their 
liability, and the local government and community benefits from redevelopment of a 
previously underutilized site that was once contaminated. Another benefit of this situation 
is that local governments and communities benefit from revitalized neighborhoods and 
revenue from tax streams. In response to growing interest, several other programs 
initiated by the EPA during this time were introduced mainly for the purpose of offsetting 
remediation costs and to provide incentives for brownfield redevelopment (Lowham, 
2007). These programs include the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative, 
Brownfields Action Agenda, and the Brownfields National Partnership. 
Congress’ passing of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act of 2002, commonly known as the Brownfields Act, reflects this 
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emerging direction in remediation of brownfield sites (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2008). This act combines two earlier pieces of federal legislation; the 
Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act and the Small Business 
Liability Act. The new legislation’s intent is to clarify ambiguity around remaining 
liability issues and provide monetary assistance for site assessment and remediation 
(Schefski, 2003). The Brownfields Act also requires states to adhere to its provisions in 
order to receive federal funding aiding with their voluntary cleanup programs. To date, 
this is the most comprehensive legislation regarding remediation and redevelopment of 
industrial brownfields. 
Changes in legislation have created a more hospitable environment for private 
developers and land owners to invest in the redevelopment of brownfield sites. 
Brownfield redevelopment opportunities are increasing since the mid 1990’s and as such, 
the motivation and reasons for such investments continue to evolve. Economic viability is 
just one value driver among other reasons to invest in brownfield redevelopment.  
Reasons for Brownfield Redevelopment 
As the availability of raw, unspoiled lands became increasingly scarce, greater 
attention was paid to the redevelopment of lands that had already been prepared for 
commercial, residential, and other uses. By the turn of the twenty-first century, growing 
concern and interest in environmental matters reached into all walks of life and 
institutions as influential and diverse as the Bank of America and the Roman Catholic 
Church called for closer scrutiny of land use patterns (Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). 
Redevelopment of property, as opposed to new development, is becoming more attractive 
to private developers and land owners for several reasons. Further, the evolving 
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regulatory approaches to redevelopment of contaminated lands continue to open doors of 
opportunity to brownfield sites (Goldstein, 2003). 
There are several shared reasons why both local governments and private 
developers or land owners desire the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Economic 
vitality is a common goal for both entities. The use of existing infrastructure offers lower 
capital contributions from private developers or land owners and provides for a more 
efficient use of tax dollars in maintaining or upgrading existing systems (Deason, Sherk, 
& Carroll, 2001, Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). The reduction of potential risks to human 
health from contamination is a priority of all local governments and also benefits private 
developers and land owners by reducing their exposure to future liabilities (Greenberg et 
al., 2001, Howland, 2003). Other reasons for pursuing redevelopment of brownfield sites 
may be independently associated with local governments, private developers, or land 
owners; however, there is sufficient overlap of these reasons to foster public support.  
The pursuit of economic viability is a presupposition to any development project 
by a private entity. Private developers or land owners that choose to invest in the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites can benefit from lower land costs (DeSousa, 2006, 
Goldstein, 2003). Incentive packages offered by federal, state, and local governments 
contribute to reducing overall development costs and increase bottom line profits. Many 
brownfield sites are located in desirable development locations, increasing their 
attractiveness to private investors (Bacot & O’Dell, 2006, DeSousa, 2006). Utilizing 
existing lands promotes infill development, reduces the expansion of urban sprawl, and 
aligns with most local government interests (Greenberg et al., 2001).  
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Local governments promote the reuse of previously developed land for several 
reasons. These reasons include, but are not limited to, the reduction of urban sprawl 
through infill development, environmental justice recognized through revitalization of 
previously damaged lands, protection of ecological resources, and in several cases, 
achieving social justice in demographic areas that may have been previously neglected 
(Alberini et al., 2005, Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). Local governments and their respective 
communities also benefit from redevelopment of certain brownfield sites with the 
creation of jobs and tax revenue. A survey of 148 cities in 2003 showed that 576,373 new 
jobs were created and nearly two billion dollars in annual tax revenues were received 
through the redevelopment of brownfield sites (US Conference of Mayors, 2003). Local 
governments may not always initiate the redevelopment of brownfield projects; however, 
in most cases they are typically very receptive to the reuse of underutilized lands. 
Collaborative efforts between private development entities and non-governmental 
community organizations illustrate the ability to impact the outcome of brownfield 
redevelopment projects that benefit all stakeholders (Gallagher & Jackson, 2008). As the 
evolution of environmental and economic policies surrounding brownfield redevelopment 
have increased the participation in such projects by private developers and landowners, 
there is an increase in economic value drivers; not only for the private sector but for the 
local government stakeholders as well (Alberini, 2007). The increased popularity of 
brownfield redevelopment projects feeds the evolution of federal and state policies and 
incentive packages that are offered to private developers and land owners. It is critical to 
understand the evolution of these polices and how they could potentially affect future 
brownfield redevelopment. 
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Policies Surrounding Brownfield Redevelopment 
The concept of brownfield redevelopment is less than thirty years old, which 
provides a relatively short window of observation for assessing long term effects of 
policy. CERLA set an arduous baseline standard for policy that proved to be ineffective 
in reaching common goals between local governments and private developers or land 
owners. A paradigm shift in policy has occurred over the last thirty years that fosters 
support from all participating entities and gives hope to resolving existing challenges 
with brownfield redevelopment under current environmental policies. Most current 
policies affecting brownfield redevelopment are commonly termed “smart growth”.  
Most of the published literature surrounding industrial brownfield redevelopment 
focuses on factors such as site assessment, liability and regulatory measures, and other 
key challenges facing private development companies and local governments (DeSousa, 
2005). Case studies are well documented through literature, discussing programs or 
policies used by government entities to attract and/or promote brownfield redevelopment. 
However, a consistent disparity in the literature is the lack of a clear definition of what 
constitutes a successful brownfield redevelopment project (Lang & McNeil, 2004). Each 
brownfield project has a unique set of characteristics and deserves an independent 
measurement of success. Efforts have been made toward the definition of uniform 
success measurements (DeSousa, 2005, Lang & McNeil, 2004, Wedding & Crawford-
Brown, 2007); however, there is no clear consensus at this time on a singular definition. 
This lack of uniformity presents a challenge in proposing a single policy or program that 
could cover all brownfield cases. Furthermore, stakeholders generally have diverse 
interests with some groups more concerned about achieving successful remediation and 
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redevelopment, while other groups focus on socioeconomic needs of affected 
communities (McCarthy, 2002). Given this apparent diversity of interests, the three broad 
goals of economic, environmental, and social justice are generally addressed separately, 
or in some cases, paired with one but rarely embrace all three (DeSousa, 2005, Greenberg 
et al., 2001). In many cases, the redevelopment of brownfield sites can be a winning 
situation for both environmental and social justice goals as well as achieving some degree 
of economic justice (Greenberg et al., 2001). 
New literature surrounding brownfield redevelopment is beginning to merge the 
three goals of economic, environmental, and social justice into one platform: smart 
growth. Greenberg et al. (2001) makes a strong argument that redevelopment of industrial 
brownfields contributes to smart growth policies. Growth regulation began with the 
concept of restricting post World War II development activities into a union of market 
preferences and social and environmental concerns by the early 1990’s (Anthony, 2008). 
Increasing awareness of environmental concerns and limited effectiveness of previous 
growth regulation policies led to the evolution of “smart growth” polices in the mid to 
late 1990’s where the focus now included both environmental and social concerns 
(Anthony, 2008, Greenberg et al., 2001). These policies continue to evolve with a focus 
on reducing urban sprawl through urban infill and reducing potential health risks through 
lowering carbon emissions. The increasing power of smart growth policies that affect 
brownfield redevelopment has influenced legislation and increased monetary sources, 
thereby creating economic opportunities for areas previously unused or underutilized 
(Greenberg et al., 2001). 
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Many brownfield locations present an opportunity to rehabilitate neighborhoods 
suffering from economic hardship, blight, and general neglect (Dennison, 1998, Meyer & 
Lyons, 2000, Greenberg et al., 2001). Despite the potential for revitalization, challenges 
with technical issues of remediation and general liability typically restrict local 
governments from undertaking significant brownfield redevelopment projects (Hird, 
1993). The early CERCLA policy took a top-down approach towards contaminated 
properties, with government playing the ultimate enforcer role and all other stakeholders 
simply reacting to federal policy. However, recent and emerging attitudes towards 
environmental policy guiding brownfield redevelopment promote a bottom-up approach. 
The initiative to revitalize contaminated lands has resulted in federal, state, and local 
governments providing financial incentives to private developers and land owners that 
offset assessment and remediation costs (Gallagher & Jackson, 2008). This evolution 
demonstrates how early polices regarded as failures because of inefficiency, cost 
overruns, or unreasonable restrictions can evolve into successful long term policies (Day 
& Johnson, 2004).  
Recent policies require public knowledge and participation in federally funded 
brownfield redevelopment programs to varying degrees per state (Gallagher & Jackson, 
2008). Requiring public participation, along with other community outreach programs, is 
a key element in ensuring that environmental and social justice is acknowledged and 
achieves greater systemic support of brownfield redevelopment projects (Gallagher & 
Jackson, 2008).  
It is clear that the federal government is open to a state-governing approach 
concerning the remediation of contaminated lands. The Uniform Environmental 
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Covenant Act of 2003 (UECA) is a pilot program currently enacted in twenty-three states 
providing institutional controls and power to enforce environmental remediation (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). UECA allows each participating state to 
specify what those controls should be, what level of cleanup is appropriate, and liability 
standards without replacing the existing regulatory framework (Uniform Environmental 
Covenants Act, 2009). This arrangement demonstrates the federal government’s support 
of federalism with respect to brownfield redevelopment.  
The legislation affecting redevelopment of brownfield sites demonstrates how 
collaborative efforts between federal, state, local, and private entities can be effective in 
ensuring long term success with brownfield redevelopment projects. This paradigm shift 
in policy, from a top-down to a bottom-up approach, underscores a stark contrast in 
thinking over a relatively short period of time. This shift also supports and gives credit to 
state governed voluntary cleanup programs, which are the primary mechanisms 
controlling new brownfield redevelopment projects.  
Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
 State run voluntary cleanup programs have been effective in fostering 
redevelopment of brownfield sites and are instrumental in reducing fears of private 
developers and land owners. Participation by independent states in these programs has 
steadily increased since the first one was introduced in 1988. Despite increasing 
popularity, VCP’s have shortcomings and continue to require monitoring and assessment 
to reach their full potential.    
 Minnesota was the first state to develop a voluntary cleanup program in 1988 as a 
way to alleviate the regulation and pressures of the stringent CERCLA law (State 
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Legislatures, 1996). An unintended outcome of CERCLA was that most landowners 
chose to abandon their contaminated properties rather than become involved in an 
expensive and burdensome cleanup process. The introduction of voluntary cleanup 
programs provides an attractive alternative that promotes reinvestment into these 
underutilized lands (Alberini, 2007, State Legislatures, 1996). While some states adhere 
to the stringent nature of CERCLA in the development of their voluntary cleanup 
programs, others tend to relax their legal requirements and prioritize private sector 
involvement with the remediation of contaminated lands. One of the underlying 
motivations for states to create a voluntary cleanup program is the relief of liability that is 
so rigorous under CERLA law (Sundar & Grossman, 2003). Private developers and land 
owners have expressed fear of future liabilities, and in response to these expressed fears, 
many states have signed MoA with the EPA that prohibit the EPA from further actions 
against brownfield sites having completed state approved voluntary cleanup programs 
(State Legislatures, 1996). The federal government remains empowered to enact 
emergency responses but this potential relief from further liability represents a significant 
step in bolstering voluntary cleanup programs throughout the nation.  
 Participation by private developers and land owners has been significant; by 2000, 
over 90 percent of the states had their own version of a voluntary cleanup program (Lang 
& McNeil, 2004, Alberini, 2007). Since the passage of the Brownfields Act in 2002, all 
states have some form of a VCP. Participation in voluntary cleanup programs is 
dependent on several variables including the size of the brownfield site, proximity to 
residential areas, and the economic potential of development (Alberini, 2007). Because 
participants in voluntary cleanup programs typically do so with brownfield sites that are 
 
 
19 
not registered with the EPA, the level of contamination tends to be lower than EPA 
registered sites (Alberini, 2007).  
Although voluntary cleanup programs have increased in popularity, studies are 
inconclusive about their effectiveness and unintended effects. Akinmoladun and Lewis 
(1998) criticized the leniency of mandated cleanup standards, limitations on the property 
owner’s civil liability for future cleanups, and the lack of comprehensive observation and 
reporting over statewide site cleanups.  
One prevalent effect of the popularity of voluntary cleanup programs has been an 
increase of recognized or stated brownfield sites. Despite no uniform regulation requiring 
the registration of brownfield sites, the quantity of existing brownfield sites across our 
country is estimated to range between one half of a million to over one million (Simons, 
1999, Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007). In some cases, the incentives stemming from 
voluntary cleanup programs have caused owners of previously undocumented parcels of 
contaminated land to come forward in attempts to receive benefits of the VCP’s 
(Alberini, 2007). This effect can be viewed as a double edged sword; it is bringing 
previously unknown contaminated properties to light while increasing the number of 
private developers and land owners looking for incentives that are ultimately paid 
through tax dollars (Alberini, 2007).  
Certain states have taken measures for protection against companies that are 
responsible for causing contamination and looking to enter a VCP as a means of 
alleviating their own liability. Minnesota, along with several other states, will not extend 
liability protection to parties that are responsible for causing the contamination 
(Cavanagh, 1995). Responsible parties are not automatically precluded from participation 
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in a state’s VCP; however, they may be subject to a higher degree of liability (Cavanagh, 
1995). In a 2002 Illinois lawsuit, the insurers of a responsible party were not held 
responsible for covering assessment and remediation costs of a responsible party after 
entering into a VCP agreement (Hazardous Waste Consultant, 2003). The courts ruled 
that the responsible party had entered into the VCP agreement on their own and that the 
additional cleanup costs were federally or state mandated; therefore, sole responsibility of 
additional cleanup costs remained with the responsible party. 
Despite these unintended effects, VCP’s remain effective and continue to grow in 
popularity. Rationale behind the creation of voluntary cleanup programs is rooted in 
motivating private developers and land owners to take action towards remediation of 
contaminated lands. In addition to remedial actions, private developers and land owners 
are interested in redevelopment that will yield returns on their investment. The offering of 
incentive packages help offset remediation costs and promote responsible redevelopment 
projects, regardless of the level of contamination. 
Incentive Packages 
Each state has autonomy in the preparation of incentive packages aimed at 
promoting the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Some incentives are directed towards 
remediation and site cleanup efforts while others are directed towards economic 
redevelopment through tax increment financing, property tax abatement, or tax credits for 
job creation (Alberini, 2007). One might ask why the federal or state government does 
not simply provide direct and complete funding for the cleanup of environmentally 
impacted sites if that is truly the desired goal? Recall that such direct and complete 
funding was one of the goals of CERCLA, but it failed to provide sufficient funding for 
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all necessary remediation activities. It is not reasonable for public funding to cover all of 
the cleanup costs, so the focus needs to turn to the potential efficiency that is recognized 
through the receipt of incentives by the private sector (Swartz & Vieweg, 2000).  
Studies in both Europe and the United States show that private developers and 
land owners are apt to be more interested in the redevelopment of contaminated lands 
when incentive packages are offered (Alberini et al., 2005). There is no set framework for 
the creation of these incentive packages; however, three broad categories of incentives 
are typically used as the foundation for most brownfields revitalization programs in each 
state. These three categories are liability protection, regulatory relief, and financial 
incentives (Alberini et al., 2005, Goldstein, 2003). Through voluntary cleanup programs, 
each state has discretion in creating incentive packages so they meet the needs of each 
stakeholders in a given project. Case studies show that previous experience with 
brownfield redevelopment projects affects the priorities of private developers and land 
owners. Lack of experience in brownfield redevelopment typically yields a strong desire 
for liability relief while greater amounts of brownfield redevelopment experience 
typically yield a strong desire for financial incentives (Alberini et al., 2005). It is 
reasonable to assume that local governments have similar, but inverse preferences 
directly relating to their level of brownfield redevelopment experience. Local 
governments with less brownfield redevelopment experience will prefer to retain their 
rights to enforce liability and offer funding assistance. 
Financial incentives can take several forms and are generally seen through five 
broad categories. These categories include (1) tax credits, (2) tax refunds, (3) low interest 
loans, (4) loan guarantees, and (5) grants (Goldstein, 2003). The first four categories are 
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available to private sector projects while federally funded grants are typically only 
available to local government entities and in some cases, non-profit agencies (Goldstein, 
2003). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Housing & 
Urban Development are two significant sources of grant funding for various activities of 
brownfield and land revitalization (U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 
2009, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009).  
Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credits and the Brownfield Job Program are two primary 
financial tools used in the creation of incentive packages for private developers and land 
owners. The Voluntary Cleanup Tax Credit program offers a tax credit of 35 percent of 
every dollar spent, up to $250,000 each year, towards the assessment and cleanup of 
contaminated sites with a bonus of ten percent of the total cleanup costs up to $50,000 
(Goldstein, 2003, Sundar & Grossman, 2003). The Brownfield Job Program offers a cash 
tax refund of $2,500 per job created as long as the capital investment is at least $2 million 
and ten or more jobs are created (Goldstein, 2003). All of these programs and financial 
incentives can be utilized together to create a lucrative incentive for private developers or 
land owners. 
The effect of liability and liability relief can dramatically affect decisions 
regarding brownfield redevelopment. In general, private developers and land owners will 
prioritize liability protection; however, there are several situations where the threat of 
liability will not hinder the redevelopment of brownfield sites. Financial solvency of 
parties involved in land transactions has significant weight in determining whether or not 
a private developer or land owner is willing to subject themselves to any further potential 
liabilities (Segerson, 1993). Brownfield Site Rehabilitation Agreements can be created 
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where the state will grant the private developer and lenders comprehensive liability 
protection against cost recovery suits (Goldstein, 2003). The Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 revised guidelines to the Innocent 
Landowners Defense and changed provisions for contiguous property owners so that 
liability can be minimized in certain scenarios and foster the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites (Collins, 2003, Sundar & Grossman, 2003). State and local governments 
have shown willingness to relax liability standards to foster the redevelopment of 
underutilized properties. 
Similarly, streamlining the application process for brownfield redevelopment 
offers regulatory relief (Lang & McNeil, 2004), thereby reducing the wait time before 
engaging in redevelopment activities. Another example of regulatory relief is the use of 
risk based corrective actions. Risk based corrective actions is a system of variable 
cleanup standards set in proportion to the intended end land use (Alberini, 2007, 
Goldstein, 2003). A variety of engineering and institutional control measures can be 
utilized including, but not limited to, ground caps, fences, barriers (engineering controls), 
permanent land use restrictions, and site monitoring (institutional controls) (Alberini, 
2007). These engineering and institutional controls are site specific and could be used in 
any combination for targeted locations corresponding directly to the proposed land use in 
each area of the site. 
Incentive packages can, by definition, influence the redevelopment of brownfield 
sites; however, literature is silent on how this influence is measured. A presupposition of 
offering incentive packages is an increase in redevelopment of contaminated lands. 
Research has not shown what level of incentive is required or to what level brownfields 
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will be redeveloped through the offering of incentives. As incentive packages continue to 
evolve, monitoring their effectiveness and appropriate revisions to future incentive 
packages is necessary to maintain and achieve value. Success measurements for 
brownfield redevelopment projects are a challenging objective that is critical to the 
further successful development of future incentive packages.  
Measurements of Successful Brownfield Redevelopment 
There is no standardized framework currently used by either public or private 
entities for the measurement of successful redevelopment of brownfield sites. This is 
primarily due to the fact that each brownfield site is unique in its defining characteristics 
and surroundings. Success is viewed differently through the eye of the stakeholder and 
can vary greatly between parties, even on the same brownfield project. Emerging 
research has begun to create standardized metrics for the measurement of success in 
brownfield redevelopment projects although there does not appear to be a unified 
proposal for any type of universal metrics system at this time (De Sousa, 2005, Lang & 
McNeil, 2004, Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007).  
Lang and McNeil’s 2004 study began with an effort to capture identifying 
conditions and attributes that could define a successful brownfield redevelopment project. 
Two surveys were conducted; the first was a qualitative questionnaire asking 
stakeholders to indicate their level of agreement with definable attributes, and the second 
survey captured site specific information such as general location, existing infrastructure, 
land description, building descriptions, and development climate (Lang & McNeil, 2004). 
Results from Lang and McNeil’s study indicated that environmental remediation should 
not be the primary focus of brownfield redevelopment projects and that outcomes of the 
 
 
25 
development itself were of primary importance (Lang & McNeil, 2004). According to 
survey results, the creation of long term jobs, new real estate and income tax bases, and 
acreage to support on-site jobs were the top three outcomes that define successful 
brownfield redevelopment (Lang & McNeil, 2004). This evidence supports the use of 
cost/benefit analysis when prioritizing indicators of success when dealing with the 
redevelopment of contaminated lands (Lang & McNeil, 2004, Wedding & Crawford-
Brown, 2007); however, environmental factors cannot be dismissed. While economics is 
of clear importance, it is environmental policy that has always been the driving factor 
behind legislation affecting brownfield redevelopment (Bacot & O’Dell, 2006) and 
therefore must be given equal consideration.  
One of the greatest challenges in creating a standardized framework for 
measurement of brownfield redevelopment success is the gathering of information. Since 
each state is autonomous in the construction of development agreements, there is no 
common thread between states in the collection of data that could be used as indicators of 
success. Bacot and O’Dell (2006) suggest that there be a federal direction, most likely 
from the EPA, for states to institute a standard framework of data collection that would 
ensure uniformity and provide a good base of comparability in measurements of 
brownfield redevelopment success. This suggestion offers a measurement of economic 
and environmental indicators that can be used to assess the viability of government 
sponsored programs (Bacot & O’Dell, 2006).  
Wedding and Crawford-Brown (2007) suggest that greater weight be given to 
aspects of sustainability when measuring success of a brownfield redevelopment. Vertical 
development, (i.e. any development beyond site remediation and infrastructure), can 
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represent more than 75 percent of total project costs and therefore deserve significant 
representation in the measurement of success for the entire brownfield redevelopment 
project (Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007). There is no known federal or state 
brownfield incentive that is intended to support vertical construction only; however, some 
incentive programs require a demonstration of public benefit and the end use of a project 
be part of the analysis when determining a site appropriate incentive package (Wedding 
& Crawford-Brown, 2007). 
Several research efforts have produced great models of success measurements but 
a unified standard does not exist. This lack of a standardized metrics system places a 
greater responsibility on local governments to assess the effectiveness of incentive 
packages that they offer. Continued work towards a unified success measurement system 
for brownfield redevelopment will undoubtedly affect future incentive packages that are 
offered to private developers or land owners. 
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III. METHOD 
 
Research Design 
In this study, I investigate how incentives offered by local governments to private 
developers or land owners influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment within their 
sphere of influence. The research effort does not manipulate any independent variables 
affecting the dependent variable. Data is collected to reflect a longitudinal trend of 
actions taken by local governments over a five year period. The goal is to determine how 
incentives offered by local governments to private developer or land owners have 
affected the rate of brownfield redevelopment within that local government’s sphere of 
influence within a five year period. Gathered data is from a self-selected sample group 
from the State of California and is inferred to represent the generalized trend or trends on 
a broad level. 
The basis of research design for this study is to investigate the potential 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, rate of 
brownfield redevelopment. Independent variables for this research effort are defined as 
five different types of incentives that a local government may offer to a private developer 
or land owner to encourage the redevelopment of a brownfield site. The five independent 
variables are: 
1. Fast-tracked or streamlined application review process 
2. Risk based cleanup standards 
3. Liability relief or indemnification from future site cleanup 
4. Tax breaks 
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5. Direct funding assistance 
The deductive manner of research attempts to show a nomothetic causal 
relationship between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable. Other 
contextual variables may affect the five types of incentives or the rate of redevelopment. 
These additional contextual variables are separated into two groups. The first group of 
contextual variables is demographics of the participating local government and is referred 
to as demographic variables. The demographic variables are: 
a. Population  
b. Households 
c. Median household income 
d. Median house value 
Each of these demographic variables is an indicator of potential resources that may 
directly affect the rate of redevelopment. Each of these demographic variables is 
correlated to the rate of redevelopment to investigate any potential relationships.   
 The remaining contextual variables are directly correlated to the five different 
incentive types that affect the rate of brownfield redevelopment. Each of these contextual 
variables is a key element in the brownfield redevelopment process and may significantly 
influence how a local government creates incentive packages. The six contextual 
variables are:  
i. Any existing framework based on characteristics of a brownfield site that 
may dictate the type and/or amount of incentive offered. 
ii. Any funding assistance from the State of California applied to the 
redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
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iii. Any funding assistance from the Federal Government applied to the 
redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
iv. Local government taking the initiative to approach private developers or 
land owners with an offer of incentives for the redevelopment of a 
brownfield site. 
v. Private developers or land owners approaching local government seeking 
incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
vi. Local government having any environmental policies requiring stricter 
cleanup standards than state or federal requirements.  
Primary data gathered from a survey instrument is used to investigate 
relationships between each of the demographic and contextual variables and the rate of 
brownfield redevelopment. The contextual variables specifically related to the brownfield 
redevelopment process are each compared directly to the five independent variables to 
investigate any correlations affecting incentive packages.  
 The hypotheses of this study focus on how each of the five different incentive 
types, or five independent variables, influence the rate of redevelopment. Two main 
presuppositions support the hypotheses. The first presupposition is that private 
developers or land owners are primarily responsible for the decision to invest in the 
redevelopment of brownfield projects. The second presupposition is that incentives 
offered by local governments will increase the rate of brownfield redevelopment. 
Research and findings provide a generalized framework of how incentives offered by 
local governments influence the rate of brownfield redevelopment within their sphere of 
influence. 
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Materials Used in Research 
 Research tool. 
 The research tool for this investigation is a survey. This is the most efficient 
means of including the greatest number of participants given time and budget constraints. 
The window of opportunity to develop and administer the survey mechanism is minimal 
and minimizes future opportunities to conduct any interviews, observations, or field 
measurements. Questions contained in the survey are designed to measure independent 
and contextual variables in an attempt to correlate their outcomes to the rate of 
redevelopment. There is no reason to hide intentions or manipulate questions and 
responses to avoid potentially sensitive topics with the construction of the survey. Any 
potential bias toward redevelopment outcomes is omitted from the research tool.   
 Delivery mechanism. 
 An internet based mechanism is the vehicle by which the survey is administered. 
Ease of preparation, low cost, facilitated data management, and detailed reports with 
integrated coding are the primary reasons for using an internet based survey. Survey 
Monkey (www.surveymonkey.com) is a recognizable, online survey engine that many 
local governments in the State of California are familiar with. The website offers secure 
response tracking that many cities and local governments have used for other surveys. All 
responses are gathered, coded and stored within the online mechanism and can be filtered 
and downloaded into different types of reports helping to create a database. 
Preparation of Research Materials 
The design of the survey is constructed in three sections to account for the 
dependent variable, independent variables, and contextual variables. Structure of the 
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survey follows this format to put the most vital information at the beginning and accounts 
for an expected decrease in interest as respondents advance through the survey (Dillman, 
2000). The number of questions in each section range from eight to 12 with several 
follow up or subsection questions. The total number of questions in the survey is 51 but a 
respondent may answer as few as 31 questions depending on the answers provided. See 
appendix 1 for brainstorm ideas, rough draft, and final draft of the survey. 
The purpose of the demographics and baseline brownfield information section is 
to gather identifying information from the participating local government as well as 
quantitative information on the existing brownfields within their sphere of influence. The 
key questions of this section identify how many brownfield sites are located within that 
local government’s sphere of influence and how many of those sites have been 
redeveloped. The offered responses to the question of how many brownfield sites are 
located within the geographic region were aggregated into groupings of one to ten, 11 to 
20, 21 to 50 and 51 or more so that respondents do not need to perform inordinate 
amounts of investigation. The offered responses to how many of those brownfield sites 
have been redeveloped are singular numbers between zero and four and then a choice of 
five or more. The rationale behind this is that there are likely to be several brownfield 
sites located within a given local government’s sphere of influence, some known and 
some only speculated, but it is most likely that only a small fraction of those sites have 
undergone redevelopment efforts (US Conference of Mayors, 2003).  
The final version of the survey limits the number of demographic and baseline 
brownfield information to only necessary information and moves quickly into questions 
regarding incentive packages. Based on the hypotheses of this study, the incentive 
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questions attempt to measure the independent variables of fast-tracked or streamlined 
application review process, risk based cleanup standards, liability relief or 
indemnification from future site cleanup, tax breaks, and direct funding assistance from 
the participating local government. The incentive questions represent the main causal 
thrust of the hypotheses and are placed as close to the beginning of the survey as possible 
so that they would have a higher rate of participation.   
Questions targeting incentive packages begin with asking whether or not the 
participating local government has offered that type of incentive as part of any incentive 
package for brownfield redevelopment. Yes or no answers allow for a bivariate analysis 
of correlation to the determined rate of redevelopment. Participating local governments 
that answer yes to any of the questions asking about each incentive type are asked to 
provide additional information about how that specific type of incentive is used. The goal 
is to determine how participating local governments use each type of incentive to foster 
the redevelopment of brownfield sites within their sphere of influence.   
Through literature research, incentive packages can be categorized into three 
types; 1) financial, 2) liability relief, and 3) regulatory relief. Questions targeting at 
financial incentives are separated between any type of tax breaks and any type of direct 
funding assistance. The purpose of this separation is twofold. First, it allows for the 
participating local government to differentiate between two types of funding sources 
when answering the questions, and second, it provides insight into how aggressive the 
participating local government is when pursuing brownfield redevelopment within their 
sphere of influence. Only one question targets liability relief. Literature has shown that 
private developers and land owners are concerned about the potential for liability of 
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future site cleanup actions (Alberini et al., 2005). The rationale behind this question is to 
identify how local governments use relief of liability and/or indemnification from future 
site cleanups to encourage private developers or land owners to redevelop brownfield 
sites. Questions targeting regulatory actions by the participating local governments are 
separated into two types. The first type of regulatory relief is the offering of fast-tracked 
or streamlined project review, and the second type is the offering of risk based corrective 
actions. The purpose of separating these two categories is that these incentives are created 
with different intentions. Fast-tracked or streamlined project review is based purely on 
project approval time and risk based corrective actions are based in the relief of excessive 
remedial actions. 
The remaining questions of the survey focus on participation in brownfield 
redevelopment, or contextual variables. Questions targeting state and/or federal 
assistance are designed to gather information on how aid from a higher level of 
government influences a local government’s actions. Specific details or amount of aid are 
not collected; it is the presence of outside aid and its influence on a local government’s 
creation of incentive packages that is of interest. Interactions between a local government 
and private developer or land owner and other conditions such as stricter cleanup 
standards may all influence the creation of incentive packages or the rate of brownfield 
redevelopment itself. Questions regarding these contextual variables are placed toward 
the end of the survey because they are not directed at the main causal thrust of the study. 
Respondents are given an opportunity to provide open ended responses on their 
reflections of lessons learned from previous brownfield redevelopment experiences. This 
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provides insight into valuable experience from practitioners who are engaged in daily 
operations and have understanding of the challenges to brownfield redevelopment. 
Participants 
This research effort focuses on the State of California as a whole; therefore, all 
forms of local government choosing to participate are welcome. Due to time and resource 
constraints, the focus of this survey is directed towards city governments, whose contact 
information is relatively easy to come by through the internet. There are 480 incorporated 
cities and towns across 58 counties in the State of California (League of California Cities, 
2009). There is no known central resource available to the public that would allow an 
individual to contact all cities located in the State of California in a single action. 
Different government entities such as California Environmental Protection Agency, 
Office of the Governor, and the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research were all 
contacted in an effort to obtain some form of a central contact point to disperse a request 
of participation in this research effort. In addition, private and/or quasi public entities 
such as the California Redevelopment Association and SCS Engineers (private 
engineering firm with vast amounts of brownfield experience) were contacted as part of 
the same effort. This effort began in October of 2008 and lasted through February of 
2009 yielding no master list of any kind that would be useful in reaching out to all 480 
California cities. 
The League of California Cities is an association of city officials that share 
knowledge and work together by exchanging information and combining resources. This 
organization is well known throughout the State of California and has contact, in one 
form or another, with nearly every city throughout the state. One of the services that the 
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League of California Cities offer to its members is an online, collaborative messaging 
system through emails known as listserves. City officials, staff and employees are free to 
join a listserve of their choosing so that they can exchange information with all other 
members. There are eight listserves; 1) administrative services, 2) community services, 3) 
employee relations, 4) environmental quality, 5) finance officers, 6) housing, community 
and economic development (HCED), 7) public safety, and 8) transportation, 
communication, and public works. The listserves most closely related to issues 
surrounding brownfield redevelopment are environmental quality, finance officers, and 
HCED. The moderator of the listserves would not allow for any non-city member to join; 
however, they were willing to send emails out on behalf of a graduate student doing 
research closely related to city business. The environmental listserve has 785 members. 
The financial officers has 821 members and the HCED listserve has 2,054 members. The 
League of California Cities does not track how many cities are represented in these 
numbers but is comfortable with estimating that approximately 65 to 70 percent of all 
California cities are represented through the combination of these three different 
listserves. In total, 3,660 city personnel, representing approximately 324 cites, were 
contacted with a request to participate in this research effort.  
The weakness of this method is the unknown number of contacts and inability to 
ensure that the correct person is contacted. The listserves are property of the League of 
California Cities; therefore, control of distribution and accurate tracking of contacted vs. 
participating cities is forfeited when using them as a distribution method. The strength of 
this distribution method is a consolidated contact source that requires minimal effort to 
contact. The League of California Cities is a recognizable and trusted source of 
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information for all member cities and it is reasonable to assume that recipients of the 
request to participate in the survey do not immediately dismiss the email as junk. This 
distribution method is the most efficient and reliable use of available resources given 
time and money constraints. 
Thirty-one local governments participated in the survey. Using 324 contacted 
cities as the base number, the 31 participating local governments represents a 9.56% 
response rate. This rate drops to 6.45% if considering all 480 California cities; however, 
there is no guarantee or reasonable indication that all California cities have brownfield 
sites within their sphere of influence. Cal/EPA estimates that there are 90,000 properties 
in the State of California that “remain idle or underutilized because of real or perceived 
environmental contamination” (Cal/EPA, 2009); however, there is no existing 
determination of how those brownfield sites are dispersed across the state, nor are there 
published measurements of how that figure was estimated. How many cities in the State 
of California contain brownfield sites within their sphere of influence? A conservative 
assumption of 85 percent yields a total of 408 cities, with the remaining 15 percent of 
brownfield sites being located somewhere other than a California city’s sphere of 
influence. Three hundred twenty-four cities represent 79.41% of all cities within the state 
that potentially have brownfield sites within their sphere of influence and the revised 
response rate now climbs to 7.59% of all potential cities. See appendix 3 for a list of 
participating local governments and their respective locations. 
The sample size of 31 local governments is too small to make a strong inference 
of trends or relationships. Exact counts of brownfield sites and their relative sizes are the 
only way to accurately determine the response rate of local governments. This precise 
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information is not available so other comparisons must be made. Population of the 
participating local governments compared to the State of California can be used as 
another comparison of sample size.  
 
Table 1 
Demographic Comparison of Sample Population to State of California 
 Median City 
Population Median Income 
Median House 
Value 
Sample Population 42,236 $44,540 $169,400 
State of California 28,862 $47,493 $211,500 
U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 and League of California Cities 
Data Sets: Census 2000; Summary File 1 (SF 1), Table P1; Summary File 3 (SF 3), Tables P53 and H76 
League of California Cities; All About Cities, Fast Facts 
 
Table 1 shows a comparison of demographic variables between the sample 
population and the State of California. Using gathered information from the 2000 census, 
the combined population of the 31 participating local governments is 1,751,784. Total 
population in the State of California is 33,871,648. The participating local governments 
represent only 5.14% of the entire state’s population. Sample size drops significantly 
lower when looking at representation of land area. Using statistics from Wikipedia, the 
total land mass of all participating local governments is 600 square miles. The total land 
mass of the State of California is 163,696 square miles. Participating local governments 
represent less than one percent, 0.37%, of the total available land mass in the State of 
California. These comparisons demonstrate the weakness of the collected sample size and 
the inability to make strong inferences from the gathered information. The primary data 
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allows only for generalized inferences of how incentives influence the rate of brownfield 
redevelopment within the participating local government’s sphere of influence.   
Identified Brownfield Sites 
California’s Department of Toxic Substance Control (DTSC) maintains a 
database of registered cleanup sites and permitted hazardous waste facilities across the 
state. This database contains registered brownfield sites that are in various stages of 
cleanup status. There are 832 brownfield sites, representing 53 counties on this list, 
broken down by status and locations. The 31 respondents represent 20 different counties, 
or 39.21% of the counties in California that have registered brownfield sites. Five 
hundred four potential brownfield sites have been identified by the respondents using 
aggregated response choices. This represents over 60 percent of the total registered 
brownfield site population in California; however, there may be several more brownfield 
sites that are not accounted for in the DTSC database.  California EPA estimates that 
there are approximately 90,000 brownfield sites in the state. The 832 registered sites 
represent approximately less than one percent of that total potential brownfield site 
population. 
Protocol and Measurements 
Aggregated answer choices are provided for the respondents for two reasons. The 
first reason is for each of answering in an attempt to increase survey participation. The 
second reason is to provide ranges of answers to questions for which local governments 
may not have precise information. Not all brownfield sites are registered with state or 
federal government and research has shown that there are potentially thousands of sites 
across the State of California that may not be accounted for. Aggregated answer choices 
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provide the most efficient means of collecting information given constraints on time and 
information. Unfortunately, aggregated answer choices make it impossible to identify an 
accurate percentage of total brownfield site representation by the respondents.  
Data from the survey is input into a database that allows descriptions and 
correlations to be made. See appendix 4 for complete database information. Descriptive 
statistics and correlations are most appropriate given the sample size and amount of 
information collected. Insufficient information was gathered to perform a multivariate 
regression analysis showing influences of each independent variable to the rate of 
redevelopment. In addition to the information gathered from the survey, demographic 
statistics from the 2000 census is entered into the database so that correlations between 
variables a, b, c, and d and the rate of redevelopment can be analyzed.  
The rate of redevelopment for each respondent is calculated by taking the number 
of redeveloped brownfield sites and dividing by the indicated number of brownfields 
located within their sphere of influence. Answer choices for the number of redeveloped 
sites are used as the numerator in calculating the rate of redevelopment. For answer 
choice “five or more”, five is used as the numerator. Since aggregated answer choices are 
provided for the number of brownfield sites, the midpoint of each grouping is used as the 
denominator in the equation. For respondents having 51 or more sites, 51 is used as the 
denominator. The mean rate of redevelopment is calculated by summing all of the 
responses for number of redeveloped sites and dividing by the sum of all answer choices 
for the number of brownfield sites. 
Each respondent is given a rank for their rate of redevelopment, with identical 
rates sharing the same rank. Two or more respondents sharing the same rank leads to 
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statistical insignificance when attempting to perform correlations. The rate of 
redevelopment, as opposed to the rank will lead to stronger generalizations of influences 
and trends. Corresponding demographic information is input into the database so that 
correlations could be made between the rate of redevelopment and values of population, 
households, median household income, and median house value. The remaining six 
contextual variables are input into a correlation database with binary answers only; zero 
representing a “no” answer and one representing a “yes” answer. 
Bivariate analysis between the different variables using Pearson’s correlation is 
the most effective means of determining measures of association given the information 
that is gathered. Measures of association that this study attempts to identify include: 
• Demographic information to rate of redevelopment 
• Correlations between the five independent variables 
• Each independent variable to the rate of redevelopment 
• Contextual variables to each independent variable 
• Contextual variables to the rate of redevelopment 
In addition to each of these correlations, a chi squared test is calculated to determine the 
accuracy in predicting the order of pairs of cases between incentives/no incentives and 
redevelopment/no redevelopment. 
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IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 Results of the survey provide an insight to how incentives offered by local 
governments to private developers or land owners influence the rate of redevelopment. 
There were 31 participating local governments, representing less than eight percent of the 
available population. This size of the sample and low representation of total population 
allows only for generalizations to be made on how these incentives work within the State 
of California. 
Rate of Redevelopment – Dependent Variable 
 A baseline rate of redevelopment was established by calculating results from two 
independent questions; 1) How many brownfield sites exist within your local 
government’s sphere of influence, and 2) How many brownfield sites have been 
redeveloped within your sphere of influence over the last five years? Both questions had 
aggregated answer choices to help respondents identify qualifying brownfield sites to the 
best of their ability. The Brownfields Act of 2002 requires brownfield sites to be 
registered, but comprehensive information is not completely available to all local 
governments at this time. No information was gathered on whether or not these 
brownfield sites are registered with the state or how participating local government 
identifies brownfield sites. 
 Figure 1 shows the number of brownfield sites that were identified in each local 
government’s sphere of influence. The reported number of brownfield sites provides one 
half of the information required to establish a baseline rate of redevelopment. Over 50 
percent of the respondents indicated that there were ten or less brownfield sites located 
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within their sphere of influence. Three respondents, representing less than ten percent of 
the entire sample, indicated that there were no brownfield sites located within their sphere 
of influence. The remaining 12 respondents indicated that there were 11 or more 
brownfield sites located within their sphere of influence. The reported number of 
brownfield sites provides one half of the information required to establish a baseline rate 
of redevelopment. The frequency of responses that indicate a low number of brownfield 
sites, ten or less, implies that the associated local government may not be aware of 
additional brownfield sites within their sphere of influence. This may also be an indicator 
of minimal levels of experience that participating local governments have with 
brownfield redevelopment.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of known brownfield sites. 
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 Figure 2 shows the number of brownfield sites that respondents have identified as 
having been redeveloped over the last five years within their sphere of influence. The 
reported number of redeveloped sites provides the second half of the information required 
to establish a baseline rate of redevelopment. Twelve respondents, representing almost 40 
percent of the entire sample, indicated that no redevelopment of brownfield sites has 
occurred within their sphere of influence over the last five years. Eleven respondents 
indicated that they had redeveloped between one and four brownfield sites and six 
respondents indicated that they had redeveloped five or more brownfield sites within the 
last five years. The frequency of responses indicating no redevelopment has a strong 
correlation to the low number of brownfield sites and demonstrates that the majority of 
participating local governments have little to no brownfield redevelopment experience.  
  
 
Figure 2. Number of redeveloped brownfield sites. 
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 The rate of redevelopment was calculated for each respondent to find individual 
scores. Mid-points of aggregated responses for the number of brownfield sites located 
within the respondent’s sphere of influence were used to represent the most accurate 
score given the available information. Responses that indicate an open ended value 
beyond a given number were entered as the lowest specified value to avoid unsupported 
rates of redevelopment. Respondents indicating either zero brownfield sites or zero 
redeveloped sites over the last five years were given a rate of redevelopment equal to 
zero. Figure 3 the frequency of redevelopment rates for the entire sample.  
 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of redevelopment rates. 
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cannot be used for statistical analysis. Measures of association are inferred weakly 
throughout the findings based on the rates of redevelopment shown above. The calculated 
rates demonstrate a wide range of redevelopment implying that participating local 
governments have different levels of experience that do not have strong relationships 
with each other.  
 All of the gathered information leading to a baseline rate of redevelopment 
indicates that participating local governments have very little to no experience with 
brownfield redevelopment. Participating local governments with rates of redevelopment 
40 percent or greater can be considered outliers compared to the entire sample. This 
information affects how incentives are viewed. It could imply that the incentives offered 
to date have been ineffective, or that the more inexperienced participating local 
governments are still experimenting with incentive packages that will be more effective 
in increasing the future rate of redevelopment. Although strong inferences cannot be 
made with this study, relationships between different types of incentives, demographic 
variables, contextual variables and the rate of redevelopment show a positive influence in 
brownfield redevelopment.  
Incentives – Independent Variables 
 Each of the five different types of incentives investigated in this study represents 
an independent variable that may influence the rate of redevelopment. Correlations 
between each type of incentive are investigated to see if any patterns emerge showing 
preferences of groupings. The incentives are also independently correlated to the rate of 
redevelopment to show how each one affects brownfield redevelopment in the 
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participating local government’s sphere of influence. Table 1 identifies each of the 
incentives that have been investigated. 
 
 Table 2 
Types of Incentives 
Incentive #1 Fast-tracked or streamlined development application process 
Incentive #2 Risk based cleanup standards 
Incentive #3 Liability relief or indemnification of future site cleanup 
Incentive #4 Tax breaks 
Incentive #5 Any type of direct funding assistance 
 
 Figure 4 shows the frequency of each incentive type being offered by 
participating local governments. Range of responses varied between 13 cases for direct 
funding assistance, representing approximately 42 percent of respondents, to only two 
cases for tax breaks, representing approximately six percent of respondents. Fourteen 
respondents, representing approximately 45 percent of all respondents, indicated that they 
did not offer any type of incentive. Only two respondents indicated that they offered four 
or more incentives together while 15 respondents indicated that they had offered between 
one and three incentives. These results show that participating local governments are 
more likely to provide direct funding assistance with the redevelopment of brownfield 
sites than any other type of incentive. This could be for a variety of reasons including the 
level of experience and a desire to retain rights of liability enforcement of the local 
government.  
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Figure 4. Frequency of incentives offered by local governments. 
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patterns of association that are statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels. Risk 
based cleanups and liability relief are the most common pairs of incentives offered by 
participating local governments. From review of the relevant literature, it is known that 
risk based cleanup standards are both a form of liability relief, so it is not surprising to 
see a strong correlation between the two types of incentives. Results support the belief 
that local governments will typically offer these two incentives together as part of an 
incentive package to promote the redevelopment of brownfield sites. See appendix E, 
table 2 for correlations between the five different types of incentives that are investigated. 
 The pairing of direct funding assistance to risk based cleanup and to liability relief 
are statistically significant at the .01 and .05 levels respectively. Direct funding assistance 
is the most frequently offered incentive to private developers or land owners by the 
participating local governments, which partially explains correlations between other types 
of incentives. Types and amounts of direct funding assistance are at the sole discretion of 
the offering local government and are not accounted for in this study. Local governments 
have less discretion over risk based cleanup standards and liability relief because these 
are directly tied to the framework of the state’s voluntary cleanup program.  
 Results shown in table 2 imply that direct funding assistance has a strong 
influence over other types of incentives that are offered by participating local 
governments. Local governments have more control over direct funding assistance and 
can utilize their discretion in how funds are allocated. The strong correlations between 
direct funding assistance, risk based cleanups and liability relief may demonstrate the 
need for financial assistance to be present before risk based cleanup or liability relief is 
offered. Research has shown the need for financial incentives to offset the costs 
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associated with contaminated lands. Risk based cleanup and liability relief may not be 
enough of an incentive to encourage redevelopment of severely contaminated lands.   
 Each independent type of incentive may be offered as part of a larger incentive 
package. The percentage of incentive packages that include each type of incentive was 
determined to further investigate any patters of groupings. Figures 5.1 through 5.5 each 
show what percentage of respective incentives are included with all incentive packages 
offered to private developers or land owners. Aggregated answer choices were provided 
to represent zero, 25, 50, 75 and 100 percent increments. Respondents indicating zero 
percent may have offered that respective incentive type for an isolated case.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Percentage of all incentive packages that include fast-tracked project review. 
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Figure 5.2. Percentage of all incentive packages that include risk based cleanup. 
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Figure 5.4. Percentage of all incentive packages that include tax breaks. 
 
Figure 5.5. Percentage of all incentive packages that include direct funding assistance. 
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each brownfield site has unique characteristics and implies that incentive packages are 
created independently for each project. Less than half of participating local governments 
chose to provide information on the percentage of all incentive packages that include 
each type of specific incentive; therefore, it was not optimal to run any type of regression 
analysis on how the number or amount of incentives included affected the rate of 
redevelopment.  
 The influence of incentives on redevelopment of brownfield sites was first 
analyzed as a total grouping of all incentives and then separately by individual incentive. 
A chi squared test was calculated to determine the measure of association between 
grouped pairs of incentives/no incentives and redevelopment/no redevelopment. The 
table and calculation were set up only to determine an ordinal level of association to 
predict the order of pairs of cases between incentives that are offered and redevelopment 
that occurs.  
 
Table 3 
Chi Square Test for Redevelopment and Incentives 
 Brownfield Redevelopment  
Redeveloped Sites No Incentives Incentives Totals 
No Redevelopment 8 4 12 
Redevelopment __6__ __13__ __19__ 
Totals 14 17 31 
 The resulting gamma of .625 means that when predicting the order of pairs of 
cases on the dependent variable of redevelopment, 62.5% more errors are made by taking 
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the set of independent variables of incentives into account. This reflects a very weak 
measure of association perhaps due to the small sample size; however, a pattern exists 
that could offer different results if the sample size were to increase. The pattern implies a 
positive relationship between incentives and the rate of redevelopment.   
 Appendix E, table 3 shows the statistical correlations between the rate of 
redevelopment and each type of incentive. Correlations between the rate of 
redevelopment and each type of incentive are very weak, and in three cases, show a 
negative relationship. Direct funding assistance has the closest correlation to rate of 
redevelopment but is not statistically significant at the .10 level. Small sample size may 
be the primary influence in this statistical outcome, but there may be other generalized 
inferences that can be drawn.  
 The results of the survey generally show that incentive packages offered by 
participating local governments to private developers or land owners for the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites only marginally influences the rate of redevelopment. 
This may imply that state or federal involvement matters more to the private developer or 
land owner when choosing to invest in brownfield redevelopment. Federal and State 
governments may be more suited to providing incentives that influence the rate of 
brownfield redevelopment. Risk based cleanup standards and liability relief are directly 
connected to the state’s voluntary cleanup program so it is not surprising that 
participating local governments have not offered these types of incentives as often as 
direct funding assistance. Local governments may generally feel more comfortable with 
offering direct funding assistance because any loss would be limited to financial terms.  
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 It is interesting that more participating local governments do not offer fast-tracked 
project review; however, this may be directly related to issues of liability relief. 
Hesitation to offer fast-tracked project review more often may be based either in a local 
governments desire to maintain as much control as possible over the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites or their lack of experience and a desire to thoroughly review all 
applications pertaining to brownfield redevelopment. That said, there is a statistically 
significant relationship at the .10 level between participating local governments that have 
stricter cleanup standards than those of the Federal or State government and fast-tracked 
project review. This suggests that there may be other variables influencing how incentive 
packages are created or even the rate of redevelopment itself. 
Demographics – Contextual Variables 
 Demographic variables of a local government may influence how incentives are 
used to foster brownfield redevelopment. The demographics of a local government may 
also directly affect the rate of redevelopment. Geographic location of each participating 
local government was identified and investigated for any potential relationships in 
addition to demographic variables of population, median house value, and available sales 
and use tax. 
 There are no formal or politically recognized boundaries in the State of California 
between north, south, central coast, or central valley areas. These boundaries are social 
boundaries only and their placement or limits are debated. Appendix C shows the 
location of all participating local governments and set boundaries between the four 
demographic areas. Figure 6 shows a percentage breakdown of participating local 
governments by demographic area. The majority of respondents came from Northern 
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California, but Southern California and the Central Valley have strong representation at 
an equal rate. The breakdown of geographic location does not yield any statistically 
significant relationships to the rate of redevelopment.  
 
 
Figure 6. Location of participating local governments. 
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 The United States Census Bureau classifies the divide between urban and rural 
populations as 50,000. Twenty respondents, approximately 65 percent, have a population 
of 50,000 or less with the remaining 11 respondents having a population of greater than 
50,000, which skews the results into showing a stronger bias towards rural populations. 
However, some of the participating local governments with rural populations are located 
inside of larger metropolitan areas but have a limited sphere of influence confined to their 
political boundaries.  
 The range of population of the respondents was from 3,621 to 243,771. The total 
population of all responding local governments is 1,751,784, which represents a little 
more than five percent of California’s 33,871,648 residents but the median population of 
participating local governments is 42,236 compared to the median population of 28,862 
for all California cities. This implies that while the sample size may be weak, the 
participating local governments represent a population that greater than most California 
cities. The range of median house values of the respondents was from $86,700 to 
$479,800, with a median value of $169,400. The median house value in the State of 
California is $211,500, which shows that participating local governments are below 
median value. Similar to population, the median house value of a local government is one 
indicator of potential resources available that could influence incentive packages for the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Sales and use tax figures for the participating local 
governments were researched to provide additional context of the sample size and its 
demographic representation. Participating local governments account for five and a 
quarter percent of all available sales and use tax for 2006 through 2007 according to the 
California State Board of Equalization.   
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 Table 4 in appendix E shows the correlations between each type of incentive and 
the different demographic variables noted. The only statistically significant positive 
relationship found was between risk based cleanup and a participating local government’s 
population, implying that local governments with larger populations are more likely to 
offer this type of incentive. A strong relationship between liability relief and population 
was not found, which is contrary to the relationship found between the two types of 
incentives earlier. Negative relationships were consistently found between fast-tracked 
project review and tax breaks and all demographic variables. This negative relationship 
may reflect the level of experience for participating local governments in addition to the 
small sample size. 
 Table 5 in appendix E shows correlations between the rate of redevelopment and 
the different demographic variables noted. The number of households and median income 
were added to investigate the potential of any other measure of association. No statistical 
significance was found between the rate of redevelopment and any of the census 
information gathered.  
Other Contextual Variables 
 There are several other factors that may contribute to the creation of incentive 
packages affecting the rate of brownfield redevelopment. Some of these factors may 
directly influence the rate of redevelopment itself. This research effort focused on the 
following additional factors: 
• Any existing framework based on characteristics of a brownfield site that may 
dictate the type and/or amount of incentive offered. 
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• Any funding assistance from the State of California applied to the redevelopment 
of a brownfield site. 
• Any funding assistance from the Federal Government applied to the 
redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
• Local government taking the initiative to approach private developers or land 
owners with an offer of incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
• Private developers or land owners approaching local government seeking 
incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
• Local government having any environmental policies requiring stricter cleanup 
standards than state or federal requirements.  
 Each of these factors was correlated to the five different types of incentives to 
investigate if there were any trends. There are several statistically significant correlations 
that appear when looking at these other factors; however, there are also correlations that 
indicate a negative relationship. Small sample size may be a primary influence in these 
relationships, but there are a few noted trends that may have larger implications. Table 6 
in Appendix E shows the correlations between each of these contextual variables and the 
five different types of incentives. 
 The statistically significant relationship, at the .10 level, between stricter cleanup 
standards and fast-tracked project review is the only other factor that appears to have a 
positive influence when looking at this incentive type. However, only one respondent 
indicated that their local government has any form of environmental policy or cleanup 
standards that are stricter than those of the state or federal government, which renders this 
relationship statistically insignificant. A weak positive connection exists between fast-
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track project review and when a participating local government approaches a developer, 
but this is also reasonable. If a local government is approaching a private developer or 
land owner to initiate redevelopment of a brownfield site, then offering a streamline 
project approval process would be an easy accommodation. The local government is 
acting as the primary stakeholder and it is in their best interest to process the 
development application in an expedited manner. It is interesting to note the appearance 
of a negative correlation between state funding and the offering of fast-track project 
review. It may be the case that a participating local government feels more secure with 
the backing of state funding and is no longer acting as the primary stakeholder; thereby 
not demonstrating the need to expedite any project approval.  
 Correlating each of the contextual variables to risk based cleanup standards has 
produced interesting results with an equal number of negative and positive relationships. 
The presence of federal funding and initiation of development by either local government 
or private parties all show a statistically significant positive relationship to risk based 
cleanup standards. This connection reflects a comfort level that local governments have 
in offering any type of incentives with liability relief when federal assistance is present. 
Existing frameworks for incentives, the presence of state funding, and stricter cleanup 
standards all yield a negative relationship to risk based cleanups with participating local 
governments. Generalized inferences can be drawn on the positive correlation between 
stricter cleanup standards and risk based cleanup, but the lack of consistency and the 
negative relationships seen with other contextual variables makes this very difficult. This 
lack of consistency is most likely contributed to the small sample size.  
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 Liability relief has similar inconsistencies as risk based cleanup standards but 
there are two positive relationships worth noting. Participating local governments that 
approach a private developer or land owner for redevelopment of brownfield sites yields 
a very strong correlation to liability relief. This supports Alberini’s research (2005) 
results showing private parties with less brownfield redevelopment experience preferring 
liability relief over any type of funding assistance. There is also a strong correlation at the 
.10 level between this incentive type and when private parties approach the participating 
local governments for redevelopment of brownfield sites. In addition, there is a strong 
correlation between liability relief and the presence of federal funding suggesting that the 
financial security provided by the federal government may promote participating local 
governments to offer this type of incentive.  
 No statistically significant relationships exist between the other contextual 
variables and tax breaks offered by participating local governments. No relationship, 
positive or negative, would be statistically significant given only two respondents 
indicating this type of incentive. Tax structure is closely related to state and federal 
systems and it would be difficult for a local government to provide additional tax breaks 
given this constraint.  
 Direct funding assistance is the most common incentive offered by participating 
local governments to private developers or land owners. It does not come as a surprise 
that the presence of state and federal funding have a strong correlation to the offering of 
this incentive. Research has shown that the redevelopment of brownfield sites can be very 
complex and requires a substantial amount of funding incentives in order to offset many 
of the negative conditions associated with most brownfield sites. Direct funding 
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assistance was offered by nearly 50 percent of participating local governments and in 
most cases, state and federal money has been dedicated to the redevelopment of all 
brownfield sites. The other strong correlation to direct funding assistance is when the 
participating local government approaches the private developer or land owner. This may 
be attributed directly to the interest of the participating local government as a primary 
stakeholder and their desire to see a specific brownfield site redeveloped. It is interesting 
to note the negative relationship between direct funding assistance and any existing 
framework within participating local governments for the creation of incentives. This 
may be a result of inexperience with participating local governments who have not 
previously offered any type of incentive to private developers or land owners.  
 Each of these factors may influence the rate of redevelopment independently. 
Table 7 in Appendix E shows the correlations between each of these contextual variables 
and the rate of redevelopment. Several correlations that are statistically significant 
between the .05 and .10 level are found when looking at this data, matching the results of 
previously presented data. There is a strong relationship between the presence of an 
existing framework for incentives and the rate of redevelopment. This is supported by a 
strong relationship between when a participating local government approaches a private 
developer or land owner to initiate the redevelopment of a brownfield site. It is likely that 
participating local governments having an existing framework for the creation of 
incentives are more likely to be proactive acting as primary stakeholders in fostering the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites.  
 There is also a strong correlation between the presence of state and federal 
funding assistance. It makes sense that any local government pursuing state or federal 
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assistance would indeed pursue both. The data also shows that private developers or land 
owners are more likely to engage the participating local governments when federal 
assistance is available. Another interesting correlation exists between participating local 
governments approaching the private developer or land owner and the other way around. 
This suggests a relationship built between the two entities for the sake of pursing a 
common interest. A presupposition of any development by private entities is the increase 
of profits, which in turn, benefits the local government. This data supports the notion, on 
a general level, that participating local governments work in conjunction with private 
developers or land owners to foster the redevelopment of brownfield sites. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Local governments more or less likely to offer incentive with state or federal 
assistance. 
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 Participating local governments had the opportunity to provide feedback on 
contextual variables that could influence the creation of incentive packages. One of the 
primary influences in the creation of any incentive package is the presence of state or 
federal assistance. Respondents were asked if they were more or less likely to offer 
incentive packages to private developers or land owners if the State of California or the 
Federal Government had already contributed to the redevelopment of a brownfield site. 
Figure 7 shows how participating local governments are likely to offer incentive 
packages based on the presence of state or federal assistance. 
 It is not surprising that the majority of participating local governments state that 
they are more likely to offer incentive packages if there is additional assistance from the 
state or federal government or that they are less likely to do so without it. What is 
interesting is the 12 respondents, representing a little less than 40 percent of all 
participating local governments, indicating that it makes no difference if state or federal 
assistance is present. This may be due to the small sample size or it may reflect a 
proactive approach by the participating local governments. There is a strong correlation 
between the local government who approached the private developer or land owner to 
initiate the redevelopment of brownfield sites (see table 6 below). This suggests that 
participating local governments acting as the primary stakeholder are interested in the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites regardless of any state of federal involvement; which 
also supports the strong presence of incentive type five, direct funding assistance from 
the local government. Only one respondent indicated that the private developer or land 
owner backed away from redevelopment after they had assessed the risk when the 
participating local government had approached them and offered financial assistance.  
 
 
64 
 Most participating local governments stated individual management of brownfield 
redevelopment sites on a case by case basis when asked if there was any framework for 
the creation of incentive packages based on site characteristics. One of the respondents 
indicated that there was an EPA Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund grant in place 
allowing different incentives for site contaminated with petroleum versus other materials. 
Two respondents indicated that the offering of incentives was tied to limits of tax 
increment and sales tax financing available through the redevelopment of the site. Two 
respondents indicated that the level of need for the project was a deciding factor and one 
respondent indicated that the location of the brownfield site was important because of 
public involvement. All of these responses are isolated but still provide insight to the 
thought process of participating local governments when creating a framework for 
incentive packages. The fundamental factor is that each brownfield site is treated 
differently for reasons ranging from level of contamination to its location. 
 Liability relief in the State of California is closely tied to the Polanco 
Redevelopment Act of 1990. The Polanco Act provides a framework of process for 
redevelopment agencies in the state to follow when cleaning up contaminated lands. This 
Act provides redevelopment agencies power to enforce prescribed cleanup plans and 
grants the ability to perform the work itself or outsouce the cleanup is the responsible 
party does not comply. The Polanco Act has become a powerful tool for redevelopment 
agencies throughout the state to foster the cleanup of contaminated lands. Incentive type 
three, liability relief, can be directly tied to the Polanco Act if the participating local 
government has enacted this legislation. One respondent indicated that the Polanco Act 
was invoked after a private developer or land owner insisted that the participating local 
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government offer incentives for the redevelopment of a brownfield site. This 
demonstrates a local governments due diligence in pursing brownfield redevelopment 
while retaining their right to enforce liability as needed.  
Other Observations 
 Each respondent was given the opportunity to provide open ended feedback on his 
or her experiences of brownfield redevelopment. Several comments echo literature and 
research surrounding all topics of redevelopment. There were other comments made that 
are interesting and can apply to any brownfield redevelopment site regardless of location. 
One respondent pointed out that corporate priorities and market conditions are a greater 
influence on the redevelopment of brownfield sites than any action taken by a local 
government. This sentiment was supported by another respondent’s comment that the 
perceived value of brownfield sites has been growing with private developers and land 
owner’s sophistication and that public agencies should be careful not to over incentivize 
any brownfield site. Economic factors are a primary concern for all parties involved with 
redevelopment projects and a noted concern by several respondents is that the cost of 
remediation is prohibitive for most contaminated sites. Federal, state, and local incentives 
are required in many cases to offset the cost of remediation associated with contaminated 
sites. One of the side effects of state or federal assistance in some cases is the 
requirement of prevailing wages, which tends to increase construction costs by 
approximately 20 to 30 percent.  
 All of these factors are easier to deal with when they are known as opposed to 
coming up as a surprise once action has been taken towards redevelopment. One 
respondent noted that private developers would rather deal with higher known costs than 
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any surprises. Other respondents indicated that education of the public and the city 
council are equally important so that additional roadblocks can be avoided and money 
can be saved. Starting with a vision of end use and working backwards to identify all the 
necessary steps of redevelopment is a noted piece of advice from one respondent. 
Unknown costs that are unexpected can be a greater deterrent for brownfield 
redevelopment than liability. Another respondent noted that private developers will shy 
away from brownfield redevelopment projects if funding is not identified and indemnity 
offered as incentives. This supports the need of local governments to have a clear and 
feasible process in place when approaching brownfield redevelopment. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Results from this study show several correlations between the five different types 
of incentives that were investigated and the rate of brownfield redevelopment. The small 
sample size of 31 participating local governments does not provide a strong base from 
which statewide inferences can be made; however, recognizable patterns have emerged 
that are interesting to observe and important to note. Each of these noted patterns may 
have significant implications for brownfield redevelopment within the State of California 
and possibly throughout the nation. The most notable pattern recognized from the sample 
was the level of experience from participating local governments. This relative level of 
inexperience, combined with the small sample size suggests that future research of how 
incentive packages offered by local governments to private developers or land owners for 
the redevelopment of brownfield sites should be pursued.   
 Over half of the participating local governments were able to identify 10 or fewer 
brownfield sites within their sphere of influence. Exact numbers and locations of all 
brownfield sites within the State of California are not known, but with an estimated 
90,000 sites in the state, it is likely that local governments having at least one brownfield 
site may have several more that they are unaware of. It is possible that individual 
respondents may be conflating brownfield sites with Superfund sites, which is only a 
small portion of all brownfield sites throughout the nation. The U.S. EPA has defined 
brownfields as sites having contaminants as well as sites that are simply perceived to 
have contaminants (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). The inclusion of 
perception is important because it expands the definition of brownfields to include sites 
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that have not been formally assessed for contamination. It is likely that there are more 
brownfield sites located within the participating local government’s sphere of influence 
than actually known or documented. Estimates ranging from 500,000 to 1,000,000 
brownfield sites across the nation (Simons, 1999, Wedding & Crawford-Brown, 2007) 
support the notion of there being more contaminated lands than most local governments 
are aware of.  
 Many brownfield sites remain dormant without any attention until the land owner 
has made the decision to either sell or redevelop. Some local governments are proactive 
in approaching private developers or land owners to initiate the redevelopment of these 
underutilized lands and results from this study show that they will typically have a higher 
rate of redevelopment. A higher rate of redevelopment will yield more tax revenue for the 
local government in addition to environmental justice for the contaminated land and in 
many cases, a social justice for the underutilized property. Local governments that 
approach private developers or land owners for the redevelopment of brownfield sites 
typically offer some form of incentive to offset the challenges associated with 
contaminated lands (Alberini et al., 2005, Swartz & Vieweg, 2000). This research has 
investigated how those incentive packages, along with other contextual variables, 
influences the rate of brownfield redevelopment.  
 The median rate of redevelopment for the participating local governments in this 
research effort was 9.80%, which is lower than expected when reviewing available 
literature that supports a growing trend of brownfield redevelopment. The median rate 
implies that the process of brownfield redevelopment is relatively new for the 
participating local governments and that more experienced local governments should be 
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included with future research to report more accurate results.  Thirty-eight percent of the 
participating local governments had a rate of redevelopment equal to zero, and in three of 
these cases, there were no identified brownfield sites at all. This condition contributes to 
the weakness in findings from this research effort, but it also suggests that local 
governments are interested in learning how to increase their rate of brownfield 
redevelopment.  
 Demographic variables may contribute to the rate of brownfield redevelopment 
within a local government’s sphere of influence. Local governments with populations of 
less than 50,000 do not have the same level of resources available as urban local 
governments with lager populations. Resources include available tax revenue and staff 
members that can dedicate time to the complex brownfield redevelopment process. 
Results from this study indicate that rural local governments may have a strong vested 
interest in redevelopment of brownfield sites located within their sphere of influence. 
This could be for several reasons including, but not limited to, high needs for tax revenue 
from underutilized lands, strong community input, or less available land area, resulting in 
a greater need for infill redevelopment.  
 Each brownfield site has unique set of characteristics and opportunities for 
redevelopment. Development potential for each brownfield site is independent and may 
be one of the greatest contributing influences in the decision to invest by private 
developers or land owners. It is reasonable to assume that not all brownfield sites are 
prime redevelopment opportunities, which explains, in part, the low number of 
brownfield sites that were reported by participating local governments.   
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Incentives 
 Incentives are a key element of the brownfield redevelopment process. Research 
has shown that private developers and land owners require incentives to offset 
remediation costs associated with contaminated lands (Alberini et al., 2005, DeSousa, 
2005). This research effort has focused on five common types of incentives offered by 
local governments to promote the redevelopment of brownfields and how those 
incentives influence the rate of redevelopment. Results from this study do not show any 
statistically significant correlations between the different types of incentives and the rate 
of redevelopment; however, these results may be misleading because of the small sample 
size. The total number of respondents with any rate of redevelopment above zero offered 
almost twice as many incentives as those respondents who did not have any 
redevelopment within their sphere of influence. This broadly shows a positive 
relationship between incentives and the occurrence of brownfield redevelopment and 
could be statistically significant if the sample size was increased. Local governments 
considering an offer of incentives to private developers or land owners for the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites should expect to see a positive return on their own 
investment.  
 Incentives are often offered as part of a package that may include more than just 
one type. This focus of this study has not been the grouping of different incentive types 
or the influence that each type has on the other; however, results have some patterns 
worth noting. Over half of the respondents indicated that they would be more likely to 
offer incentives to private developers or land owners if there is a presence of state or 
federal government assistance. Less than half of the respondents had even pursued state 
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or federal government assistance, which can explain the weak correlation between 
incentive packages and rate of redevelopment found in this study. Results of this study 
support the idea that local governments are less likely to become involved with 
brownfield redevelopment unless there is some form of state or federal assistance to 
supplement their efforts.   
 The most common type of incentive offered by participating local governments in 
this study was direct funding assistance. Preference in offering direct funding assistance 
shows a bias towards economic priorities or goals that local governments may wish to 
achieve through brownfield redevelopment. Several of the respondents commented on 
how the redevelopment of brownfield sites within their sphere of influence was directly 
linked to tax increment financing from that project. This demonstrates an economic 
expectation that participating local governments have when offering direct funding 
assistance. The cost of offering direct funding assistance is outweighed by the potential 
benefit recognized through a redeveloped brownfield site. There is no guarantee of 
financial gain from any development project, but local governments should give strong 
consideration to offering direct funding assistance with an expectation of benefits.  
 There is insufficient evidence to reject the hypothesis that different types of 
incentives positively affect the rate of redevelopment. Despite statistical correlations that 
show no significant relationships, the small sample size and other noted trends indicate 
that local governments offering incentives to private developers or land owners for the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites within their sphere of influence will see a higher rate 
of redevelopment. Data that was gathered shows that local governments are willing to 
offer incentive packages even when the resulting rate of redevelopment is zero. This 
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demonstrates a high level of interest by local governments in redevelopment of 
underutilized lands that could bring economic, environmental, and social benefits to all 
stakeholders. The relative inexperience of participating local governments in this study 
may also suggest that more experience will lead to refinement of incentive packages that 
are more effective in increasing the rate of redevelopment. Contextual variables that may 
differ between local governments can also have a significant effect on the rate of 
redevelopment.  
Future Research 
 Future research of brownfield redevelopment should continue to focus on how 
incentives influence the rate of redevelopment. A longitudinal study to investigate 
changes in rate of redevelopment influenced by incentives may be possible if the same 
respondents are willing to participate in the future. Other types of incentives may be 
included with future investigation in addition to patterns of incentive packages that local 
governments offer to private developers or land owners. Specific attention should be 
directed to correlations between incentives that are offered and the rate of redevelopment 
for the participating local government.  
 Researchers interested in furthering this study should attempt to increase the 
sample size from the State of California or concentrate on a targeted geographic area. 
Local governments could be expanded to include county and other municipal agencies 
that may have experience with brownfield redevelopment. This research effort may also 
be duplicated in a similar manner to geographic areas outside the State of California. 
Inferences from this study are useful to any level of local government interested or 
experienced with brownfield redevelopment. Aggregated response choices should be 
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grouped by smaller and more consistent increments to avoid duplicate rankings with a 
larger sample size. Case studies showing the effectiveness of incentives on the rate of 
brownfield redevelopment should be developed and included in any future research. 
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SURVEY BRAINSTORM 
 
? Name of municipal agency (and department housed in – might make a difference if you are in an 
environment/health versus economic development) 
 
? Solely responsible for brownfield redevelopment issues within municipal/geographical area (if 
not, can you provide the name of the other individuals responsible and describe what they are 
responsible for) 
 
? Average fiscal year operating budget over last five years 
 
? Are you aware of state and federal assistance programs for the redevelopment of brownfields 
(separate state and federal) 
 
? Estimated brownfield sites within sphere of influence (site # or/and acreage) 
 
? How many brownfield sites have been redeveloped over the last five years (how many sites have 
received certification of completion? How many sites have been redeveloped?) 
 
? Level of community involvement with in the redevelopment of brownfield sites (by 
redevelopment type?) 
 
? Required disclosure to the public of any incentives that are offered to private companies 
 
? When did your agency start offering incentives to private developers for the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? / When was the first incentive offered? 
 
? Does your agency believe that offering incentives is beneficial to the community? 
 
? Have you increased or decreased the amount of incentives offered over the last five years? (or 
changed the relative percentage of type?) 
 
? Have private developers or land owners specifically asked for incentives or stated that they will 
not redevelop without an incentive? 
 
? Have you offered any unsolicited incentives to land owners of brownfield sites? / Have they been 
redeveloped as a result? 
 
? Does your municipality have any environmental polices different that those of the state or federal 
government that require the cleanup of brownfield sites? 
 
Incentives 
? Have you offered any incentives with the brownfield sites that have been redeveloped within the 
last five years 
 
? Have you offered streamlined plan review process as an incentive 
 
? Have you offered risk based cleanup standards as an incentive 
 
? Have you offered any relief or indemnification of future site cleanup as an incentive 
 
? Have you offered any tax breaks to property owners or development companies as an incentive 
 
? Have you offered any direct funding assistance towards remediation or any other part of 
development as an incentive. Money may be from any funding source. 
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BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT SURVEY 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS & BASELINE BROWNFIELD INFORMATION 
 
1) Name of the city/county/other participating in the survey. 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
2) Department within municipality that is responsible for completing this survey. 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
3) Contact information of person responsible for completing this survey. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________ 
 
4) Is your department solely responsible for the redevelopment of brownfield sites and 
related issues within your municipal/geographic area? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. If not, will you please provide contact information for other individuals or 
departments who may be responsible for issues relating to the redevelopment of 
brownfields?  
 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
b. Does your department typically take the lead role in the redevelopment of 
brownfields? 
 
Yes  No 
 
c. What other departments have participated with issues relating to the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites within your municipal or geographic areas?  
 
Planning 
Economic Development 
Housing 
Other (Please describe) 
 
 
5) Please indicate your departments’ average fiscal year operating budget over the last five 
years. 
________________________________________________________________________
____________ 
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6) To the best of your knowledge, how many brownfield sites exist within your 
muni1cipality’s sphere of influence. 
 
0 
1 - 10 
11 - 20 
21 - 50 
 51 or more 
 
7) To the best of your knowledge, how much acreage within your sphere of influence would 
be considered a brownfield site? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
____________ 
 
8) How many brownfield sites have been redeveloped within your sphere of influence over 
the last five years? 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 or more  
 
 
a. How many redeveloped brownfield sites have received a certification of 
completion over the last five years? 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 or more  
 
INCENTIVE PACKAGES 
 
The following questions are targeting incentives that are offered by your municipality to private 
developers and/or land owners for the purposes of brownfield site redevelopment. The only 
incentives pertaining to this section of the survey are those that your municipality offers 
above and beyond those of the state or federal government.  
 
9) Of the brownfield sites that have been redeveloped over the last five years within your 
sphere of influence (identified in question #8a above), how many have had locally 
provided incentive packages as part of the redevelopment process? 
 
All 
None 
Other Amount (please specify) 
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10) Is your municipality more or less likely to offer additional incentive packages to private 
developers and/or land owners for the redevelopment of brownfield sites if the State of 
California or the Federal government has contributed incentives 
 
Will only offer incentive packages if State or Federal incentives are offered 
More Likely 
Less Likely 
Makes no difference 
Other (please explain) 
 
11) Has your municipality increased or decreased the amount of incentive packages offered 
to private developers or land owners over the last five years? 
 
Increased  Decreased 
 
a. Why?  
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________ 
 
12) Has your municipality offered any type of fast-tracked or streamlined application review 
process as an incentive? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered 
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives 
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or 
land owners include this type of incentive? 
 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
Other Percentage (please provide)  ___________________ 
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13) Has your municipality offered any type of risk based cleanup standards as an incentive? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered 
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives 
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or 
land owners include this type of incentive? 
 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
Other Percentage (please provide)  ___________________ 
 
14) Has your municipality offered any type of relief or indemnification of future site cleanup 
as an incentive? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered 
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives 
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
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d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or 
land owners include this type of incentive? 
 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
Other Percentage (please provide)  ___________________ 
 
15) Has your municipality offered any type of tax breaks to private developers or land owners 
as an incentive? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered 
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives 
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or 
land owners include this type of incentive? 
 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
Other Percentage (please provide)  ___________________ 
 
16) Has your municipality offered any type of direct funding assistance towards remediation 
or any other part of development as an incentive? (Money may come from any funding 
source.) 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Is this type of incentive used as the primary incentive in packages that are offered 
with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
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b. Is this type of incentive your municipality’s preference over other incentives 
offered with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
c. Is this offered as a part of every incentive package tied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No  N/A 
 
d. What percentage of incentive packages that are offered to private developers or 
land owners include this type of incentive? 
 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
Other Percentage (please provide)  ___________________ 
 
17) Please describe how your municipality decides on what types of incentive packages or 
the amount of incentives that are offered to private developers or land owners for the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Discretionary action by municipality 
Direct community input 
Feedback from private developer or land owner 
Other (please describe) 
 
Please use the space below to outline and/or describe the decision making process: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________ 
 
18) Do the incentive packages that are offered to private developers or land owners change 
from site to site? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Is there any framework within your municipality that dictates the type and/or 
amount of incentive offered in relation to characteristics of the brownfield site? 
 
Yes  No 
 
Please describe: 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________ 
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PARTICIPATION IN BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT 
 
19) Are you aware of brownfield redevelopment assistance programs that are available from 
the State of California? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Has your municipality applied for or received any assistance money from the 
State of California to redevelop any brownfield site within your geographic area? 
 
Yes  No 
 
b. What approximate percentage of brownfield sites has your municipality received 
funding for from the State of California? 
 
Less than 25% 
25%  
50% 
75% 
100% 
 
c. If any state monies have been received and applied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites, what is the approximate percentage of total project costs 
received per site? 
 
Less than 5% 
5% to 10% 
11% to 25% 
26% or more 
 
20) Are you aware of brownfield redevelopment assistance programs that are available from 
the federal government? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. Has your municipality applied for or received any assistance money from the 
federal government to redevelop any brownfield site within your geographic 
area? 
 
Yes  No 
 
b. What approximate percentage of brownfield sites has your municipality received 
funding for from the federal government? 
 
Less than 25% 
25%  
50% 
75% 
100% 
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c. If any federal monies have been received and applied to the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites, what is the approximate percentage of total project costs 
received per site? 
 
Less than 5% 
5% to 10% 
11% to 25% 
26% or more 
 
21) Has your municipality ever taken the initiative to offer any type of unsolicited incentive 
to a private developer or land owner to foster the redevelopment of a brownfield site 
within your sphere of influence? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. When was the first incentive offered to a private developer or land owner for the 
redevelopment of a brownfield site? (approximate month and year) 
 
_________________________________________________________________
_____________ 
 
22) To the best of your knowledge, how many private development companies within your 
sphere of influence have worked with the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
None 
1 – 5 
6 – 10 
11 – 20 
21 or more 
 
23) Has any private developer or land owner approached your municipality seeking an 
incentive package for the redevelopment of a brownfield site? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. As a result, were any incentives offered to the private developer or land owner 
for the redevelopment of a brownfield site? 
 
Yes  No 
 
i. Please describe any related circumstances 
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
b. Have any private developers or land owners insisted that your municipality offer 
them an incentive package for the redevelopment of a brownfield site and/or 
stated that they would not develop without one? 
 
Yes  No 
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i. Please describe any related circumstances 
 
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
____________________________ 
 
24) Has your municipality approached any private developers or land owner with an 
unsolicited offer of incentives to redevelop a brownfield site? 
 
Yes  No 
 
a. If so, has the private developer or land owner engaged in the redevelopment of 
that brownfield site due to the incentive package that was offered? 
 
Yes  No 
 
25) Does your municipality believe that there are community benefits from the offering of 
incentive packages to private developers or land owners for the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Not at all 
Rarely, only in special circumstances 
Sometimes 
All the time 
Case by case basis 
 
Please describe two (2) potential benefits that your municipality would consider desirable 
to the community. 
1) ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2) ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
26) Is there any level of public disclosure that is required for incentive packages that are 
offered to private developers or land owners for the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No 
 
 
If yes, please describe: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
27) Does your municipality seek community participation with the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No 
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a. If so, what level of community participation is required? 
 
Public notices 
Public hearings 
Required public input 
Other (please describe) 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
b. If so, what level of community participation is preferred? 
 
Public notices 
Public hearings 
Required public input 
Other (please describe) 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
__________________________ 
 
c. Does the type of redevelopment dictate the level of community participation? 
 
Yes  No 
 
 If yes, how so: 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________ 
 
28) Does your municipality have any environmental policies different to those of the state or 
federal government that requires the cleanup of brownfield sites? 
 
Yes  No 
 
Please describe: 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
29) Please describe any best practices that your municipality has incorporated into handling 
issues related to the redevelopment of brownfield sites? 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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30) Please provide one or two examples of lessons learned from a past project where a 
brownfield site was (or was not) redeveloped based on an incentive package offered to 
the private developer or land owner. 
 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
31) Would you be willing to participate in an interview regarding the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites within your sphere of influence? 
 
Yes  No 
 
  
Appendix B: Invitation to Participants 
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INVITATION TO PARTICIPANTS 
 
To All Local Governments in California, 
 
I am a graduate student in City and Regional Planning at California Polytechnic State University 
in San Luis Obispo working on a master’s thesis in brownfield redevelopment. The following 
survey has been created to aid in my research of incentive packages influencing the 
redevelopment of brownfield sites. Your participation will contribute to an increased 
understanding of factors that influence brownfield redevelopment throughout the State of 
California. Findings and implications from this research effort will be available for your use by 
the third quarter of 2009.  
 
It is important that your local government entity contributes to this research effort regardless of 
your redevelopment experience with brownfields. A greater range of responses will provide more 
detailed and accurate information. All participating local governments will potentially benefit 
from statewide research that may aid in future brownfield redevelopment projects. The survey 
should take approximately 30 minutes to complete. Please follow the link below to participate in 
this survey on line. Survey responses need to be collected by April 3, 2009.  
 
If you have any questions or further comments, please feel free to contact me. Thank you for your 
time and participation. 
 
Erik Simon 
ebsimon@calpoly.edu  
 
If you are not the person who is or would be responsible for decisions surrounding incentives for 
brownfield redevelopment, please forward this request to the appropriate person if possible. 
Thank you. 
 
 
 
  
Appendix C: Map of California Participants 
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Appendix D: Database 
  
Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing
Other (please 
describe)
To the best of your 
knowledge, how many 
brownfield sites exist 
within your 
municipality's sphere 
of influence?
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing Fire Department 11 to 20
Planning 1 to 10
Resource Management 
Department, 11 to 20
Economic 
Development redevelopment 1 to 10
Planning
Economic 
Development 1 to 10
Planning Engineering 21 to 50
Planning assisted the 
Agency with a few 11 to 20
-6700
Economic 
Development Housing 1 to 10
Economic 
Development Housing
City Engineer  Public 
Works Director 1 to 10
brownfields within our 
jurisdiction. None
Planning
Economic 
Development
Environmental Health 
Department 21 to 50
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing 21 to 50
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing
development 
department consists of 21 to 50
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing 51 or more
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing 51 or more
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing 1 to 10
dev't are in the same 
dept.  We take the lead 51 or more
Planning
Economic 
Development Public Works 1 to 10
1 to 10
Planning public works 1 to 10
Economic 
Development 1 to 10
Planning
Economic 
Development Housing
infrastructure and 
stormwater issues. 21 to 50
Planning Housing CUPA 51 or more
would participate, 
however, we don't None
Economic 
Development 1 to 10
Planning
Economic 
Development City Engineer 1 to 10
Planning None
Planning
Department as a 
condition of 1 to 10
Planning Housing
Works and 
Development Services) 1 to 10
Planning 1 to 10
Planning Economic Development 1 to 10
What other departments within your municipality or geographic area have participated with 
issues directly related to the redevelopment of brownfield sites? (check all that apply)
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
To the best of your 
knowledge, how much 
acreage within your 
municipality's sphere 
of influence would be 
considered 
brownfields?
To the best of your 
knowledge, how many 
brownfield sites have 
been redeveloped 
within your sphere of 
influence over the last 
five years?
Of the brownfield sites 
that have been 
redeveloped over the 
last five years within 
your sphere of 
influence (identified in 
question #10 from 
previous page), how 
many had locally 
provided incentive 
packages as part of the 
redevelopment 
process?
Other Amount (please 
specify)
Is your municipality 
more or less likely to 
offer additional 
incentive packages to 
private developers 
and/or land owners for 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites if the 
State of California of 
the Federal 
Government has 
contributed 
incentives? 
would estimate 100 acre 2 None More Likely
15 acres None None More Likely
None
unknown None None Makes no difference
300 None None More Likely
3 75% Makes no difference
d be more that we will no 4 Other Less than 25%.  The ince Makes no difference
25 3 25% More Likely
35 None More Likely
0 None None Makes no difference
Don't know 4 50% Makes no difference
5 or more None More Likely
10 2 Other assisted in clean up  thro More Likely
2000 5 or more All Makes no difference
100 acres plus 5 or more None More Likely
10 None None More Likely
200 5 or more All Makes no difference
>10 acres 1 All More Likely
5 1 None Will only offer incentives if State or Federal in
over 50?????? None None Makes no difference
50 1 None Makes no difference
150 5 or more All More Likely
250 5 or more Other The CDC provides techn Makes no difference
0 None None not applicable as we don Makes no difference
4 Acres 2 None More Likely
10? None None N/A More Likely
0 None None
mer gas stations parcel. 1 None Makes no difference
About 3.5 acres 2 50% More Likely
70 None None More Likely
70 acres 1 None More Likely
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
increased or 
decreased the amount 
of incentive packages 
offered to private 
developers and/or 
land owners over the 
last five years?
Based on your 
response to the 
previous question #13, 
why has your 
municipality increased 
or decreased the 
amount of incentive 
packages that are 
offered to private 
developers and/or 
land owners over the 
last five years?
Please use the space 
below to describe the 
key factors that are 
taken into account 
when creating 
incentive packages for 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites.
Is there any framework 
within your 
municipality, based on 
characteristics of a 
brownfield site, that 
dictates the type 
and/or amount of 
incentive that is 
offered? Please describe
Increased Offered incentives to maWe do all of the cleanup No
Stayed the same Santa Barbara wants to kPublic or Private use, lev No
Stayed the same No
Stayed the same No
Stayed the same NA City has little to offer as No
Stayed the same "Incentive" is perhaps n Same as 14 above. Yes Each project is individua
Stayed the same We don't offer incentive It really depends on the No
Stayed the same community economic be No
Increased In order to stimulate the Return on the investmen No
Stayed the same No
Stayed the same NA Proposed use of site; im Yes We have an EPA Brownf
Stayed the same NA Federal Grants or within No
Decreased Lack of local funds avail Cost, level of clean up, e Yes Level of contamination, 
Stayed the same Return on investment, pu No Case by case
Stayed the same No
Stayed the same Yes The location of the site is
Increased No incentive, no project Project needs gap financ Yes Need based regardless 
Stayed the same First priority is to develo Yes Amount of incentive for 
Stayed the same no packages offered Albany is a small city, pr No
Decreased prevailing wage trigger we have not done any No
Stayed the same No incentives provided/NA No
Stayed the same type of development an No
Stayed the same The CDC has worked wiThe way State redevelop No SFS CDC has been invol
Stayed the same BA NA No
Stayed the same Matching funds required No
Stayed the same n/a Credible developer with No
Stayed the same n/a We have not offered inc No
Stayed the same City or Agecny has not oIf site would not be rede No If site could not be deve
Decreased Over the years the State Additional property tax Yes RDA has adopted an inv
Stayed the same No
Decreased State Prevailing Wage R Development potential, No
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
offered any type of fast-
tracked or streamlined 
application review 
process as an incentive 
for brownfield 
redevelopment?
Is fast-tracked or 
streamlined 
application review 
process used as the 
primary incentive in 
packages that are 
offered with the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Is a fast-tracked or 
streamlined 
application review 
process your 
municipality's 
preference over other 
incentives offered with 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Is fast-tracked or 
streamlined 
application review 
process offered as a 
part of every incentive 
package tied to the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
What approximate 
percentage of 
incentive packages 
that are offered to 
private developers or 
land owners include a 
fast-tracked or 
streamlined 
application review 
process?
Other percentage 
amount
No
No
No
Yes No No No Other (please specify) none
Yes Yes Yes No 25%
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes It is the only type of inceNo No 25%
No
Yes No No No 75%
No
No
No
No
Yes No No No 50%
Yes Yes Yes Yes 100%
No
No
No
No
No
Yes No No Yes 100%
Yes It is the only type of incentive offered 50%
No
Incentive #1
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
offered any type of risk 
based clean up 
standards as an 
incentive for the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Are risk based cleanup 
standards used as the 
primary incentive in 
packages that are 
offered with the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Are risk based cleanup 
standards your 
municipality's 
preference over other 
incentives offered with 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Are risk based cleanup 
standards offered as 
part of every incentive 
package tied to the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
What approximate 
percentage of 
incentive packages 
that are offered to 
private developers or 
land owners include 
risk based cleanup 
standards?
Other percentage 
amount
No
No
No
No
Yes No No No 75%
Yes No Yes Yes Other (please specify) All projects except hous
No
No
No
No
Yes No No No 75%
No
No
Yes No No Yes 75%
No
No
Yes No No Yes 100%
No
No
No Other (please specify) what is risk based clean
No
Yes No No No 25%
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Incentive #2
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
offered any type of 
relief or 
indemnification of 
future site cleanup as 
an incentive to 
redevelop brownfield 
sites?
Is relief or 
indemnification of 
future site cleanup 
used as the primary 
incentive in packages 
that are offered with 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Is relief or 
indemnification of 
future site cleanup 
your municipality's 
preference over other 
incentives offered with 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Is relief or 
indemnification of 
future site cleanup 
offered as a part of 
every incentive 
package tied to the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
What approximate 
percentage of 
incentive packages 
that are offered to 
private developers or 
land owners include 
relief or 
indemnification of 
future site cleanup?
Other percentage 
amount
Yes Yes No No 75%
No
No
No
No
Yes Yes No No Other (please specify) As often as appropriate.
No
No
No
No
Yes No No No 25%
No It is the only type of incentive offered
No
Yes Yes No No 50%
No
No
Yes No No No 25%
No
No
No
No
Yes Yes No Yes Other (please specify) 100%  Some Polanco Ac
Yes N/A N/A No 25%
No
Yes Yes Yes No 75%
No
No
No No No No Other (please specify) none
No
No
No
Incentive #3
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
offered any type of tax 
breaks to private 
developers or land 
owners as an incentive 
for redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Are any type of tax 
breaks used as the 
primary incentive in 
packages that are 
offered with the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Are tax breaks your 
municipality's 
preference over other 
incentives offered with 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Are tax break 
incentives offered as a 
part of every incentive 
package tied to the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
What approximate 
percentage of 
incentive packages 
that are offered to 
private developers or 
land owners include 
tax breaks of any type?
Other percentage 
amount
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes No No Yes 50%
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes No No No 25%
No
No
No
No
No
Yes - See "Other" N/A N/A No Other (please specify) In the past the CDC coul
No
No
No
No
No No No No Other (please specify) none
No
No
No
Incentive #4
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
offered any type of 
direct funding 
assistance towards 
remediation or any 
other part of 
development as an 
incentive? (Money may 
come from any funding 
source).
Is any type of direct 
funding assistance 
towards remediation 
or any other part of 
development used as 
the primary incentive 
in packages that are 
offered with the 
redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Is any type of direct 
funding assistance 
towards remediation 
or any other part of 
development your 
municipality's 
preference over other 
incentives offered with 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites?
Is direct funding 
assistance towards 
remediation or any 
other part of 
development offered 
as a part of every 
incentive package tied 
to the redevelopment 
of brownfield sites?
What percentage of 
incentive packages 
that are offered to 
private developers or 
land owners include 
any type of direct 
funding assistance 
towards remediation 
or any other part of 
development?
Other percentage 
amount
Yes Yes No Yes 75%
No
No
No
No
Yes Yes No No 50%
Yes N/A N/A No Other (please specify) At least 75%.  Many of th
Yes It is the only type of inceYes No 25%
Yes No No No 50%
No
Yes Yes No No Other (please specify) 5-10%
No
Yes Yes N/A No 50%
Yes No No No 25%
No
No
Yes No No Yes 50%
No
No
No
Yes Yes No Yes Other (please specify) 100%
Yes No N/A No Other (please specify) See above.
No
No
No
No No No No Other (please specify) none
Yes No No No 25%
Yes No No No
No
Incentive #5
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
applied for and/or 
received any 
assistance money from 
the State of California 
for the redevelopment 
of any brownfield site 
within your sphere of 
influence?
What approximate 
percentage of 
brownfield sites has 
your municipality 
received funding for 
from the State of 
California? Other Amount
Has your municipality 
applied for and/or 
received any 
assistance money from 
the federal 
government for the 
redevelopment of any 
brownfield site within 
your sphere of 
influence?
What approximate 
percentage of 
brownfield sites has 
your municipality 
received funding for 
from the federal 
government? Other Amount
Yes 50% Yes 50%
Yes Other 0% No Other 0%
Yes Less than 25% Yes Less than 25%
No No
No Less than 25% No Less than 25%
Yes Other 30-percent Yes Other This funding was just aw
No Other I can't think of any. No Other I can't think of any.
Yes 50% No Less than 25%
Yes Less than 25% Yes Less than 25%
No Other None - We have no browNo Other None -We have no brow
No Less than 25% Yes Less than 25%
No Other I don't know No Other I don't know
Yes Other Borwn field grant from thNo Less than 25%
No Yes 50%
No 50% Yes 25%
No Less than 25% No Less than 25%
Yes Less than 25% Yes 25%
No Less than 25% No Less than 25%
No Less than 25% No Less than 25%
No Other 0 No Other 0
No Less than 25% Yes Less than 25%
No Less than 25% Yes 50%
No Other Not applicable Yes Less than 25%
Yes Less than 25% Yes Less than 25%
No Less than 25% No Less than 25%
No Less than 25% No Less than 25%
No Other none, State assistance haNo Other none, Federal assistance
Yes 25% No Other 0% (none)
Yes 75% Yes 75%
Yes Less than 25% Yes Less than 25%
State Funding Assistance Federal Funding Assistance
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Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Has your municipality 
ever taken the 
initiative to approach 
any private developer 
or land owner with an 
offer of incentives for 
the redevelopment of a 
brownfield site?
If yes, has the private 
developer or land 
owner engaged in the 
redevelopment of that 
brownfield site due to 
the incentive package 
that was offered?
Has any private 
developer or land 
owner approached 
your municipality 
seeking an incentive 
package for the 
redevelopment of a 
brownfield site? 
If yes, were any 
incentive packages 
offered to that private 
developer or land 
owner as a result of 
their actions?
Have any private 
developers or land 
owners insisted that 
your municipality offer 
them an incentive 
package for the 
redevelopment of a 
brownfield site and/or 
stated that they would 
not develop without 
one? 
Please describe any 
related circumstances
Yes in progress of negotiatinNo No
No No No
No No No
No No No
Yes No Yes Yes - Expedited processYes
Yes Yes. Yes Yes. Yes immunity from regulator
No No No
Yes Yes Yes
No Yes Yes
No No No
Yes No. Yes We are currently reviewNo
No Yes No
Yes yes No No
Yes yes Yes yes Yes Without our assistance th
No No No
No No No
Yes sometimes Yes Funding/tax break, reguYes Where the funding gap 
Yes yes Yes yes No
No No No
No Yes No
Yes Yes Yes Yea Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes That's when the negotiat
Yes Yes No Yes Invocation of the Polanc
No Yes No
No No No
No No No
Yes NO.  Once they evaluateNo No
No No No
No Yes no No
106
Local Government
1 City of Tulare
2 City of Santa Barbara
3 City of Redding
4 City of Sanger
5 City of San Luis Obispo
6 City of National City 
7 City of Pittsburg
8 City of Lemoore
9 City of Delano
10 City of Rohnert Park
11 City of Santa Cruz
12 City of Poway
13 City of Livermore
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 Town of Paradise
17 City of Emeryville
18 City of Pleasant Hill
19 City of Albany
20 City of Hanford
21 City of Huntington Beach
22 City of Stockton
23 City of Santa Fe Springs
24 City of Novato
25 Culver City
26 City of Ojai
27 City of Selma
28 Thousand Oaks
29 City of Dinuba
30 City of Mt. Shasta
31 City of Eureka
Does your municipality 
have any 
environmental policies 
different to those of the 
state or federal 
government that 
requires stricter 
cleanup standards for 
brownfield sites? Please describe
Please describe one or 
two examples of 
lessons learned from a 
past project where a 
brownfield site was (or 
was not) redeveloped 
based on an incentive 
package offered to the 
private developer or 
land owner.
Would you be willing 
to participate in an 
interview regarding 
the redevelopment of 
brownfield sites within 
your sphere of 
influence?
No In my experience, the siYes
No A site was contaminatedNo
No Yes
No No
No Corporate priorities andNo
No The perceived value of bYes
No NA No
No No
No Problem is dealing with No
No We have no brownfieldsNo
No Our main funding sourceYes
No Yes
No No
No Begin with the end in miYes
No No
No Yes
No If the municipal govt (CiYes
No Yes
No Yes
No No
No No
No Redeveloping BrownfielYes
Yes Because SFS is part of anEach project stands on i Yes
No Yes
The City depends on theI'm sure the site would dNo
No n/a No
No none to offer. No
No Developers will not dev No
No No
No The cost of remediation Yes
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Mid Range of 
Brownfield Sites 
Within SOI
Number of 
Redeveloped 
Sites
Percentage of 
Redeveloped 
Sites
1 City of Tulare 15 2 13.33%
2 City of Santa Barbara 5 0 0.00%
3 City of Redding 15 0 0.00%
4 City of Sanger 5 0 0.00%
5 City of San Luis Obispo 5 0 0.00%
6 City of National City 35 3 8.57%
7 City of Pittsburg 15 4 26.67%
8 City of Lemoore 5 3 60.00%
9 City of Delano 5 0 0.00%
10 City of Rohnert Park 0 0 0.00%
11 City of Santa Cruz 35 4 11.43%
12 City of Poway 35 5 14.29%
13 City of Livermore 35 2 5.71%
14 Chula Vista/San Diego 51 5 9.80%
15 City of Gardena 51 5 9.80%
16 Town of Paradise 5 0 0.00%
17 City of Emeryville 51 5 9.80%
18 City of Pleasant Hill 5 1 20.00%
19 City of Albany 5 1 20.00%
20 City of Hanford 5 0 0.00%
21 City of Huntington Beach 5 1 20.00%
22 City of Stockton 35 5 14.29%
23 City of Santa Fe Springs 51 5 9.80%
24 City of Novato 0 0 0.00%
25 Culver City 5 2 40.00%
26 City of Ojai 5 0 0.00%
27 City of Selma 0 0 0.00%
28 Thousand Oaks 5 1 20.00%
29 City of Dinuba 5 2 40.00%
30 City of Mt. Shasta 5 0 0.00%
31 City of Eureka 5 1 20.00%
504 57
Mean = 11.31%
Respondent
Raw Data
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Rate of 
Redevelopment Rank
8 City of Lemoore 60.00% 1
25 Culver City 40.00% 2
29 City of Dinuba 40.00% 2
7 City of Pittsburg 26.67% 4
18 City of Pleasant Hill 20.00% 5
19 City of Albany 20.00% 5
21 City of Huntington Beach 20.00% 5
28 Thousand Oaks 20.00% 5
31 City of Eureka 20.00% 5
12 City of Poway 14.29% 10
22 City of Stockton 14.29% 10
1 City of Tulare 13.33% 12
11 City of Santa Cruz 11.43% 13
14 Chula Vista/San Diego 9.80% 14
15 City of Gardena 9.80% 14
17 City of Emeryville 9.80% 14
23 City of Santa Fe Springs 9.80% 14
6 City of National City 8.57% 18
13 City of Livermore 5.71% 19
2 City of Santa Barbara 0.00% 20
3 City of Redding 0.00% 20
4 City of Sanger 0.00% 20
5 City of San Luis Obispo 0.00% 20
9 City of Delano 0.00% 20
10 City of Rohnert Park 0.00% 20
16 Town of Paradise 0.00% 20
20 City of Hanford 0.00% 20
24 City of Novato 0.00% 20
26 City of Ojai 0.00% 20
27 City of Selma 0.00% 20
30 City of Mt. Shasta 0.00% 20
Respondent
Ranked Data
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Score (Xi) Deviations (Xi ‐ X) Deviations
2
60.00% 47.95% 22.99%
40.00% 27.95% 7.81%
40.00% 27.95% 7.81%
26.67% 14.62% 2.14%
20.00% 7.95% 0.63%
20.00% 7.95% 0.63%
20.00% 7.95% 0.63%
20.00% 7.95% 0.63%
20.00% 7.95% 0.63%
14.29% 2.24% 0.05%
14.29% 2.24% 0.05%
13.33% 1.28% 0.02%
11.43% ‐0.62% 0.00%
9.80% ‐2.24% 0.05%
9.80% ‐2.24% 0.05%
9.80% ‐2.24% 0.05%
9.80% ‐2.24% 0.05%
8.57% ‐3.48% 0.12%
5.71% ‐6.33% 0.40%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
0.00% ‐12.05% 1.45%
373.50% 0.00% 62.18%
X = 12.05%
Variance = 2.07% N‐1 used as the denominator because 
this is for a random sample
Standard Deviation = 14.40%
Standard Deviation
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Respondent Rate Respondent Population
City of Lemoore 60.00% City of Stockton 243,771
Culver City 40.00% City of Huntington Beach 189,594
City of Dinuba 40.00% Chula Vista/San Diego 173,556
City of Pittsburg 26.67% Thousand Oaks 117,005
City of Pleasant Hill 20.00% City of Santa Barbara 92,325
City of Albany 20.00% City of Redding 80,865
City of Huntington Beach 20.00% City of Livermore 73,345
Thousand Oaks 20.00% City of Gardena 57,746
City of Eureka 20.00% City of Pittsburg 56,769
City of Poway 14.29% City of Santa Cruz 54,593
City of Stockton 14.29% City of National City 54,260
City of Tulare 13.33% City of Poway 48,044
City of Santa Cruz 11.43% City of Novato 47,630
Chula Vista/San Diego 9.80% City of San Luis Obispo 44,174
City of Gardena 9.80% City of Tulare 43,994
City of Emeryville 9.80% City of Rohnert Park 42,236
City of Santa Fe Springs 9.80% City of Hanford 41,686
City of National City 8.57% City of Delano 38,824
City of Livermore 5.71% Culver City 38,816
City of Santa Barbara 0.00% City of Pleasant Hill 32,837
City of Redding 0.00% Town of Paradise 26,408
City of Sanger 0.00% City of Eureka 26,128
City of San Luis Obispo 0.00% City of Lemoore 19,712
City of Delano 0.00% City of Selma 19,444
City of Rohnert Park 0.00% City of Sanger 18,931
Town of Paradise 0.00% City of Santa Fe Springs 17,438
City of Hanford 0.00% City of Dinuba 16,844
City of Novato 0.00% City of Albany 16,444
City of Ojai 0.00% City of Ojai 7,862
City of Selma 0.00% City of Emeryville 6,882
City of Mt. Shasta 0.00% City of Mt. Shasta 3,621
1,751,784
Percentiles
95th 40.00% 95th 181,575
90th 26.67% 90th 117,005
75th 20.00% 75th 57,258
60th 11.43% 60th 47,630
55th 9.80% 55th 44,084
50th 9.80% 50th 42,236
45th 9.19% 45th 40,255
40th 5.71% 40th 38,816
33871648
5.17%
56,509       
111
Respondent Households Respondent Income
City of Stockton 78,556 Thousand Oaks $76,815
City of Huntington Beach 73,657 City of Livermore $75,322
Chula Vista/San Diego 57,705 City of Poway $71,708
Thousand Oaks 41,793 City of Pleasant Hill $67,489
City of Santa Barbara 35,605 City of Huntington Beach $64,824
City of Redding 32,103 City of Novato $63,453
City of Livermore 26,123 City of Albany $54,919
City of Santa Cruz 20,442 City of Rohnert Park $51,942
City of Gardena 20,324 Culver City $51,792
City of San Luis Obispo 18,639 City of Santa Cruz $50,605
City of Novato 18,524 City of Pittsburg $50,557
City of Pittsburg 17,741 City of Santa Barbara $47,498
Culver City 16,611 City of Emeryville $45,359
City of Rohnert Park 15,503 Chula Vista/San Diego $44,861
City of Poway 15,467 City of Ojai $44,593
City of National City 15,018 City of Santa Fe Springs $44,540
City of Hanford 13,931 City of Lemoore $40,314
City of Pleasant Hill 13,753 City of Gardena $38,988
City of Tulare 13,543 City of Hanford $37,582
Town of Paradise 11,591 City of Stockton $35,453
City of Eureka 10,957 City of Selma $34,713
City of Delano 8,409 City of Redding $34,194
City of Albany 7,011 City of Tulare $33,637
City of Lemoore 6,450 City of Dinuba $33,345
City of Selma 5,596 City of Sanger $32,072
City of Sanger 5,220 City of San Luis Obispo $31,926
City of Santa Fe Springs 4,834 Town of Paradise $31,863
City of Dinuba 4,493 City of National City $29,826
City of Emeryville 3,975 City of Delano $28,143
City of Ojai 3,068 City of Mt. Shasta $26,500
City of Mt. Shasta 1,669 City of Eureka $25,849
95th 65,681 95th $73,515
90th 41,793 90th $67,489
75th 20,383 75th $51,867
60th 16,611 60th $45,359
55th 15,485 55th $44,727
50th 15,018 50th $44,540
45th 13,842 45th $39,651
40th 13,543 40th $37,582
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Respondent
Median House 
Value
City of Santa Barbara $479,800
City of Santa Cruz $411,900
City of Novato $381,400
City of Albany $334,800
Thousand Oaks $324,800
City of Livermore $314,600
City of Huntington Beach $311,800
Culver City $311,100
City of Pleasant Hill $294,000
City of Poway $284,200
City of San Luis Obispo $278,800
City of Ojai $272,100
City of Rohnert Park $237,300
Chula Vista/San Diego $197,000
City of Gardena $179,500
City of Santa Fe Springs $169,400
City of Pittsburg $165,100
City of Emeryville $161,600
City of National City $141,500
Town of Paradise $129,100
City of Mt. Shasta $124,800
City of Redding $121,600
City of Stockton $119,500
City of Eureka $114,000
City of Lemoore $110,900
City of Hanford $102,900
City of Selma $97,000
City of Dinuba $97,000
City of Tulare $94,700
City of Sanger $92,200
City of Delano $86,700
95th $396,650
90th $334,800
75th $302,550
60th $237,300
55th $188,250
50th $169,400
45th $163,350
40th $141,500
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Respondent Rank Population Households Income
Median House 
Value
City of Lemoore 1 23 24 17 25
Culver City 2 19 13 9 8
City of Dinuba 2 27 28 24 28
City of Pittsburg 4 9 12 11 17
City of Pleasant Hill 5 20 18 4 9
City of Albany 5 28 23 7 4
City of Huntington Beach 5 2 2 5 7
Thousand Oaks 5 4 4 1 5
City of Eureka 5 22 21 31 24
City of Poway 10 12 15 3 10
City of Stockton 10 1 1 20 23
City of Tulare 12 15 19 23 29
City of Santa Cruz 13 3 3 14 14
Chula Vista/San Diego 14 11 16 28 19
City of Gardena 14 8 9 18 15
City of Emeryville 14 30 29 13 18
City of Santa Fe Springs 14 26 27 16 16
City of National City 18 10 8 10 2
City of Livermore 19 7 7 2 6
City of Santa Barbara 20 5 5 12 1
City of Redding 20 6 6 22 22
City of Sanger 20 25 26 25 30
City of San Luis Obispo 20 14 10 26 11
City of Delano 20 18 22 29 31
City of Rohnert Park 20 16 14 8 13
Town of Paradise 20 21 20 27 20
City of Hanford 20 17 17 19 26
City of Novato 20 13 11 6 3
City of Ojai 20 29 30 15 12
City of Selma 20 24 25 21 27
City of Mt. Shasta 20 31 31 30 21
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Rate Population Households Income
Median House 
Value
60.00% 19,712 6,450 $40,314 $110,900
40.00% 38,816 16,611 $51,792 $311,100
40.00% 16,844 4,493 $33,345 $97,000
26.67% 56,769 17,741 $50,557 $165,100
20.00% 32,837 13,753 $67,489 $294,000
20.00% 16,444 7,011 $54,919 $334,800
20.00% 189,594 73,657 $64,824 $311,800
20.00% 117,005 41,793 $76,815 $324,800
20.00% 26,128 10,957 $25,849 $114,000
14.29% 48,044 15,467 $71,708 $284,200
14.29% 243,771 78,556 $35,453 $119,500
13.33% 43,994 13,543 $33,637 $94,700
11.43% 54,593 20,442 $50,605 $411,900
9.80% 173,556 57,705 $44,861 $197,000
9.80% 57,746 20,324 $38,988 $179,500
9.80% 6,882 3,975 $45,359 $161,600
9.80% 17,438 4,834 $44,540 $169,400
8.57% 54,260 15,018 $29,826 $141,500
5.71% 73,345 26,123 $75,322 $314,600
0.00% 92,325 35,605 $47,498 $479,800
0.00% 80,865 32,103 $34,194 $121,600
0.00% 18,931 5,220 $32,072 $92,200
0.00% 44,174 18,639 $31,926 $278,800
0.00% 38,824 8,409 $28,143 $86,700
0.00% 42,236 15,503 $51,942 $237,300
0.00% 26,408 11,591 $31,863 $129,100
0.00% 41,686 13,931 $37,582 $102,900
0.00% 47,630 18,524 $63,453 $381,400
0.00% 7,862 3,068 $44,593 $272,100
0.00% 19,444 5,596 $34,713 $97,000
0.00% 3,621 1,669 $26,500 $124,800
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Respondent Area
City of Lemoore 8.50
Culver City 5.13
City of Dinuba 3.40
City of Pittsburg 16.82
City of Pleasant Hill 7.10
City of Albany 5.50
City of Huntington Beach 31.60
Thousand Oaks 55.00
City of Eureka 14.40
City of Poway 39.30
City of Stockton 75.10
City of Tulare 16.70
City of Santa Cruz 15.60
Chula Vista/San Diego 51.20
City of Gardena 5.82
City of Emeryville 1.90
City of Santa Fe Springs 8.90
City of National City 9.20
City of Livermore 24.10
City of Santa Barbara 41.40
City of Redding 59.60
City of Sanger 4.70
City of San Luis Obispo 10.80
City of Delano 10.20
City of Rohnert Park 6.43
Town of Paradise 18.20
City of Hanford 13.10
City of Novato 28.30
City of Ojai 4.40
City of Selma 4.30
City of Mt. Shasta 3.70
California 163,696
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Respondent
Ranked Rate of 
Redevelopment
Rate of 
Redevelopment 
Local 
Government 
Offers Incentive 
Type 1
1 City of Lemoore 1 60.00% 0
2 Culver City 2 40.00% 0
3 City of Dinuba 2 40.00% 1
4 City of Pittsburg 4 26.67% 0
5 City of Pleasant Hill 5 20.00% 0
6 City of Albany 5 20.00% 0
7 City of Huntington Beach 5 20.00% 0
8 Thousand Oaks 5 20.00% 0
9 City of Eureka 5 20.00% 0
10 City of Poway 10 14.29% 0
11 City of Stockton 10 14.29% 1
12 City of Tulare 12 13.33% 0
13 City of Santa Cruz 13 11.43% 0
14 Chula Vista/San Diego 14 9.80% 0
15 City of Gardena 14 9.80% 1
16 City of Emeryville 14 9.80% 1
17 City of Santa Fe Springs 14 9.80% 1
18 City of National City 18 8.57% 0
19 City of Livermore 19 5.71% 0
20 City of Santa Barbara 20 0.00% 0
21 City of Redding 20 0.00% 0
22 City of Sanger 20 0.00% 1
23 City of San Luis Obispo 20 0.00% 1
24 City of Delano 20 0.00% 0
25 City of Rohnert Park 20 0.00% 0
26 Town of Paradise 20 0.00% 0
27 City of Hanford 20 0.00% 0
28 City of Novato 20 0.00% 0
29 City of Ojai 20 0.00% 0
30 City of Selma 20 0.00% 0
31 City of Mt. Shasta 20 0.00% 1
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Respondent
1 City of Lemoore
2 Culver City
3 City of Dinuba
4 City of Pittsburg
5 City of Pleasant Hill
6 City of Albany
7 City of Huntington Beach
8 Thousand Oaks
9 City of Eureka
10 City of Poway
11 City of Stockton
12 City of Tulare
13 City of Santa Cruz
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 City of Emeryville
17 City of Santa Fe Springs
18 City of National City 
19 City of Livermore
20 City of Santa Barbara
21 City of Redding
22 City of Sanger
23 City of San Luis Obispo
24 City of Delano
25 City of Rohnert Park
26 Town of Paradise
27 City of Hanford
28 City of Novato
29 City of Ojai
30 City of Selma
31 City of Mt. Shasta
Local 
Government 
Offers Incentive 
Type 2
Local 
Government 
Offers Incentive 
Type 3
Local 
Government 
Offers Incentive 
Type 4
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 1 0
0 1 0
1 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
1 1 1
0 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
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Respondent
1 City of Lemoore
2 Culver City
3 City of Dinuba
4 City of Pittsburg
5 City of Pleasant Hill
6 City of Albany
7 City of Huntington Beach
8 Thousand Oaks
9 City of Eureka
10 City of Poway
11 City of Stockton
12 City of Tulare
13 City of Santa Cruz
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 City of Emeryville
17 City of Santa Fe Springs
18 City of National City 
19 City of Livermore
20 City of Santa Barbara
21 City of Redding
22 City of Sanger
23 City of San Luis Obispo
24 City of Delano
25 City of Rohnert Park
26 Town of Paradise
27 City of Hanford
28 City of Novato
29 City of Ojai
30 City of Selma
31 City of Mt. Shasta
Local 
Government 
Offers Incentive 
Type 5
Sought State 
Funding
Applied State 
Funding
1 1 50%
0 1 12.50%
1 1 25%
1 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 1 12.50%
0 0 0%
1 0 0%
1 1 50%
1 0 0%
1 0 0%
0 0 0%
1 1 12.50%
1 0 0%
1 1 30%
1 1 100%
0 1 0%
0 1 12.50%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
1 1 12.50%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
0 0 0%
1 1 0%
* Mt Shasta 
indicated that 
they applied 
state funding to 
75% of sites but 
also entered that 
0 sites had been 
redeveloped
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Respondent
1 City of Lemoore
2 Culver City
3 City of Dinuba
4 City of Pittsburg
5 City of Pleasant Hill
6 City of Albany
7 City of Huntington Beach
8 Thousand Oaks
9 City of Eureka
10 City of Poway
11 City of Stockton
12 City of Tulare
13 City of Santa Cruz
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 City of Emeryville
17 City of Santa Fe Springs
18 City of National City 
19 City of Livermore
20 City of Santa Barbara
21 City of Redding
22 City of Sanger
23 City of San Luis Obispo
24 City of Delano
25 City of Rohnert Park
26 Town of Paradise
27 City of Hanford
28 City of Novato
29 City of Ojai
30 City of Selma
31 City of Mt. Shasta
Sought Federal 
Funding
Applied Federal 
Funding
Local 
Government 
Approached 
Developer / 
Land Owner
0 0% 1
1 12.50% 1
0 0% 1
0 0% 0
0 0% 1
0 0% 0
1 12.50% 0
0 0% 0
1 12.50% 0
0 0% 0
1 50% 1
1 50% 1
1 12.50% 1
1 50% 1
1 25% 0
1 25% 1
1 12.50% 1
1 Undetermined 1
0 0% 1
0 0% 0
1 12.50% 0
0 0% 0
0 0% 1
1 12.50% 0
0 0% 0
0 0% 0
0 0% 0
0 0% 0
0 0% 0
0 0% 0
1 0% 0
** Mt Shasta 
indicated that 
they applied 
federal funding 
to 75% of sites 
but also entered 
that 0 sites had 
been 
redeveloped
120
Respondent
1 City of Lemoore
2 Culver City
3 City of Dinuba
4 City of Pittsburg
5 City of Pleasant Hill
6 City of Albany
7 City of Huntington Beach
8 Thousand Oaks
9 City of Eureka
10 City of Poway
11 City of Stockton
12 City of Tulare
13 City of Santa Cruz
14 Chula Vista/San Diego
15 City of Gardena
16 City of Emeryville
17 City of Santa Fe Springs
18 City of National City 
19 City of Livermore
20 City of Santa Barbara
21 City of Redding
22 City of Sanger
23 City of San Luis Obispo
24 City of Delano
25 City of Rohnert Park
26 Town of Paradise
27 City of Hanford
28 City of Novato
29 City of Ojai
30 City of Selma
31 City of Mt. Shasta
Land Owner / 
Developer 
Approached 
Local 
Government
Local 
Government Has 
Stricter Cleanup 
Standards
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
1 0
1 1
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1 0
0 0
0 0
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Appendix E: Statistical Tables 
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STATISTICAL TABLES 
Table 4 
Correlation Between Different Incentive Types 
  Fast-Tracked 
Project Review 
Risk Based 
Cleanup 
Liability 
Relief Tax Breaks 
Direct Funding 
Assistance 
Fast-Tracked 
Project 
Review 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .271 .158 .145 .246
Significance  .141 .397 .436 .183
Number 31 31 31 31 31
Risk Based 
Cleanup 
Pearson Correlation .271 1.000 .644** .204 .411*
Significance .141  .000 .272 .022
Number 31 31 31 31 31
Liability 
Relief 
Pearson Correlation .158 .644** 1.000 .145 .545**
Significance .397 .000  .436 .002
Number 31 31 31 31 31
Tax Breaks Pearson Correlation .145 .204 .145 1.000 .309
Significance .436 .272 .436  .091
Number 31 31 31 31 31
Direct 
Funding 
Assistance 
Pearson Correlation .246 .411* .545** .309 1.000
Significance .183 .022 .002 .091  
Number 31 31 31 31 31
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).    
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).    
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Table 5 
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Different Incentive Types 
  
Rate of 
Redevelopment
Fast-Tracked 
Project 
Review 
Risk Based 
Cleanup 
Liability 
Relief Tax Breaks
Direct 
Funding 
Assistance 
Rate of 
Redevelopment 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000 -.066 -.106 .107 -.133 .244
Significance  .724 .570 .565 .477 .187
Number 31 31 31 31 31 31
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Table 6 
Correlation Between Demographic Variables and Incentives 
  Streamlined 
Project Review
Risk Based 
Cleanup Liability Relief Tax Breaks 
Direct Funding 
Assistance 
Population Pearson Correlation -.058 .356* .244 -.162 .082
Sig. (2-tailed) .759 .050 .185 .385 .659
N 31 31 31 31 31
Households Pearson Correlation -.085 .320 .198 -.190 -.001
Sig. (2-tailed) .651 .079 .286 .307 .995
N 31 31 31 31 31
Income Pearson Correlation -.371* -.185 -.129 -.152 -.220
Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .318 .491 .414 .235
N 31 31 31 31 31
Median  
House 
Value 
Pearson Correlation -.316 .033 -.055 -.210 -.330
Sig. (2-tailed) .083 .859 .768 .256 .070
N 31 31 31 31 31
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Table 7 
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Demographic Variables  
  
Rate of 
Redevelopment Population Households 
Median 
Income 
Median House 
Value 
Rate of 
Redevelopment 
Pearson Correlation 1.000 .009 .010 .163 -.045
Sig. (2-tailed)  .960 .957 .381 .809
N 31 31 31 31 31
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Table 8 
Correlation Between Incentives and Other Contextual Variables  
  Framework 
For 
Incentives  
State 
Funding 
Federal 
Funding 
Government 
Approaches 
Developer 
Developer 
Approaches 
Government
Stricter 
Cleanup 
Standards 
Incentive1 Pearson Correlation .123 -.015 .205 .246 .057 .310
Sig. (2-tailed) .511 .938 .267 .183 .759 .090
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Incentive 2 Pearson Correlation -.425* -.054 .376* .576** .540** -.089
Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .773 .037 .001 .002 .632
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Incentive 3 Pearson Correlation -.353 .137 .650** .694** .354 .310
Sig. (2-tailed) .052 .463 .000 .000 .051 .090
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Incentive 4 Pearson Correlation -.228 .330 .289 .043 .289 -.048
Sig. (2-tailed) .218 .069 .114 .819 .114 .798
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
Incentive 5 Pearson Correlation -.245 .398* .411* .603** .280 .215
Sig. (2-tailed) .184 .026 .022 .000 .128 .246
N 31 31 31 31 31 31
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 9 
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Other Contextual Variables 
  
Rate 
Framework 
For Incentives
State 
Funding 
Federal 
Funding  
Government 
Approaches 
Developer 
Developer 
Approaches 
Government
Stricter 
Cleanup 
Standards 
Rate of Pearson Correlation 1.000 .297 .247 -.008 .397* .134 -.029
Sig. (2-tailed)  .105 .180 .964 .027 .472 .877
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Framework 
For Incentives 
Pearson Correlation .297 1.000 -.119 -.229 -.104 -.090 .038
Sig. (2-tailed) .105  .522 .215 .577 .631 .839
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
State  
Funding 
Pearson Correlation .247 -.119 1.000 .343 .264 -.056 -.145
Sig. (2-tailed) .180 .522  .059 .151 .766 .436
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Federal 
Funding 
Pearson Correlation -.008 -.229 .343 1.000 .280 .349 .201
Sig. (2-tailed) .964 .215 .059  .128 .055 .278
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Government 
Approaches 
Developer 
Pearson Correlation .397* -.104 .264 .280 1.000 .411* .215
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .577 .151 .128  .022 .246
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      
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Table 9 - Continued 
Correlation Between Rate of Redevelopment and Other Contextual Variables 
  
Rate 
Framework 
For Incentives
State 
Funding 
Federal 
Funding 
Government 
Approaches 
Developer 
Developer 
Approaches 
Government
Stricter 
Cleanup 
Standards 
Developer 
Approaches 
Government 
Pearson Correlation .134 -.090 -.056 .349 .411* 1.000 .201
Sig. (2-tailed) .472 .631 .766 .055 .022  .278
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Stricter 
Cleanup 
Standards 
Pearson Correlation -.029 .038 -.145 .201 .215 .201 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .877 .839 .436 .278 .246 .278  
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).      
 
